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This thesis examines why European Muslim women have left their home countries to 
join ISIS in Syria and Iraq, as well as the process of radicalization that they have 
undergone before taking the decision of making hijrah, migration. The unprecedented 
number of European women that have joined the terrorist organization has attracted the 
attention of the scholars towards an under-researched field. In order to contribute to this 
vacuum of knowledge, the research has compiled a theoretical framework that explains 
the radicalization process and the motives for migration in a coherent and 
comprehensive way.  
The Frame Theory applied to the Social Movement Theory is a cornerstone in this study 
that is also anchored in the sociological concept of dual cultural alterity and pull and 
push factors. This theoretical framework is the backbone of the quantitative and 
qualitative content analysis conducted in this study. The posts of European Muslim 
women living in Syria have been analyzed in order to understand their motives to 
migrate and the process of radicalization.  
The results of the analysis showed the women claim to go to Syria because it is a 
religious obligation and because of the opportunity to live under the Sharia law. They 
also identified other incentives that the so-called Caliphate offered them as financial 
security or the belonging to a community. The grievances from the West such as the 
discrimination or the persecution of the Muslim community were less mentioned. 
Despite migration is not the only theme in the posts; the majority of those related with 
migration were aimed at recruiting other women. The results also indicated the 
existence of a recruitment network where some women are available to give 
information and help and a discourse focused on other Muslim women and Muslims in 
general.  
Therefore, European Muslim women who have gone to Syria to join ISIS underwent a 
process of violent radicalization in a social environment, most probably through the 
social media, before taking the decision. This radicalization process led them to believe 
that going to Syria was mandatory and the only way to be able to practice ‘real’ Islam 
and be blessed with a place in heaven.  
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The outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011 and the subsequent rise of ISIS a year 
later attracted the attention of hundreds of Westerners, which was later reinforced by the 
proclamation of the so-called Caliphate in the summer of 2014. The phenomenon of 
foreign fighters is far from being new, however, this time there is an unprecedented 
high number of Westerners and especially females. 
The exact number of Western foreign fighters remains ambiguous owing to the lack of 
accurate information from European States. It is estimated that more than 5,000 
Europeans have gone to Syria or Iraq to become foreign fighters, most of them coming 
from just four countries: UK, France, Belgium and Germany (Barrett 2015, p. 12). The 
vast majority have enlisted in the ISIS contingent and according to a recent study from 
the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) there are between 3,922 and 
4,294 European foreign fighters (Van Ginkel and Entenmann 2016, p. 3).  
But what has attracted the most media attention is the more than 550 young Western 
females, at least 70 German, 60 British and between 63 and 70 French, that have 
reportedly gone to Syria to join ISIS (Baker and De Leede 2015; Hoyle et al. 2015, p. 
8). Females have always been involved in foreign conflicts and terrorism, including 
jihadist groups such as the Black Widows, a Chechen female suicide squad that 
committed terrorist attacks in Russia between 2000 and 2005 (Baker and De Leede 
2015, p. 2).  
Conversely, these women are not joining the terrorist group to commit a suicide attack 
or fight in the battlefield; their role is strictly restricted to the household. These women, 
usually known as ‘jihadi brides’ by the media, have been depicted in a simplistic and 
stereotypical way, where they are portrayed as naïve victims of jihadists that have been 
seduced into going to Syria to find love and a romanticized jihad (Ibid. p. 5). However, 
the motives behind their decision to leave their families in the West to join ISIS, a 
terrorist organization, are far more complex that a simple romantic story or a fascination 
for jihad. 
Western female migration to Syria to join ISIS has until recently been an un-researched 
topic, in part because of the limited number of female foreign fighters. Consequently, 
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all the studies focused on this new phenomenon agree about the limited information 
available regarding female migration. It is necessary to have a better understanding of 
the motivations of these women because their role in Syria and Iraq is not to fight, but 
to assist the jihadists in their state-building initiatives by raising their children (Baker 
and De Leede 2015, p. 8; Al 2012). The differences with male foreign fighters and the 
reduced number of studies about women in ISIS, makes it necessary to specifically 
focus on women. In order to contribute to this niche of knowledge, this research aims at 
answering the following thesis statement: 
“Why European women decide to leave their home countries and move to Syria 
and Iraq to join ISIS?” 
This study focuses on European women, who, despite being born into the European 
values of freedom, gender equality and liberal rights, decide to leave their comfortable 
and stable life in their home countries to move to Syria and Iraq, a war-torn territory, to 
join ISIS, a terrorist misogynist organization ruled by the strictest interpretation of the 
Sharia law. In order to prevent women from joining a terrorist organization such as 
ISIS, it is first necessary to understand their grievances, the incentives offered by ISIS, 
and the role that the social media play in the violent radicalization process, so that an 
accurate counter-narrative for countering violent extremism can be developed. 
Along these lines, this research identifies and analyzes the different pull and push 
factors that influenced European female Muslims to take the decision of making hijrah, 
migrating to Syria and Iraq to join ISIS (Saltman and Smith 2015). In addition, this 
paper analyzes the role of the social media in their radicalization process. This research 
uses the content analysis methodology as the approach to answer the above-mentioned 
question. The analysis is structured around three hypotheses that are defined in the 
methodology chapter, and later tested with the results from the analysis in the 
discussion chapter. 
This research does not use the term ‘female foreign fighters’ because women do not 
participate in the fight in Syria. They are referred to as ‘female migrants’ or simply 
European female Muslims. In addition, it is necessary to clarify that when Syria is 
mentioned in the text, it refers to all the territory controlled by ISIS, including the Iraqi 
territory. In some cases both countries will be also mentioned.  
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2 Literature Review 
This chapter offers a holistic understanding of the theories and concepts that are 
necessary to conduct this research, focused on European Muslim women’s 
willingness to join the terrorist organization ISIS. Firstly, a contextual framework is 
provided in order to understand the rise of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, the role of western 
women in ISIS territories and the situation of Muslim women in Europe.  
Secondly, the radicalization process is explained from a group and an individual 
perspective, anchoring the research on the framing theory proposed by Quintan 
Wiktorowicz (2004), which is part of the theoretical framework of the social 
movement theory; and the concept of dual cultural alterity of Akil N. Awan (2015), 
whose principles are also shared by some authors of the French sociological 
tradition, such as Olivier Roy (2007).  
Finally, several grievances and motives are identified based on the studies by the 
Institute for Strategic Dialogue, which will be used in the formation of the 
methodological framework. 
2.1 Historical Background  
2.1.1 The Rise of ISIS and the Syrian Civil War 
Since 2014, ISIS has become the terrorist organization par excellence, surpassing the 
well-known al Qaeda. However, the beginnings of this ruthless Salafi organization date 
from 2006, after the death of Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq 
(AQI), who could be considered ISIS mastermind because of his “brutal and sectarian 
approach to the understanding of jihad” (Stern and Berger 2015, p. 13).  
Despite Bin Laden opposed the extreme violence against Sunni Muslims, after the death 
of Zarqawi in an air strike, Zawahiri, the second in command of al Qaeda Central, 
eulogized his commitment and services, and called for the establishment of an Islamic 
State in Iraq (Ibid. p. 22-26). This plea was heard by a coalition of jihadists from the 
Mujahideen Advisory Council who a few months later created the Islamic State in Iraq 
(ISI). Zarqawi’s successor in AQI pledge allegiance to this new organization and his 
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appointed leader, Abu Omar al Baghdadi (Weiss and Hassan 2015). However, during 
the following years al Qaeda in Iraq lost the population’s support to the Sons of Iraq, 
also known as the Sunni Awakening Movement, a coalition between different religious 
and ethnic communities that, in cooperation with the Iraqi Government and with US 
support, were able to considerably diminish violence in Iraq for some years (Stern and 
Berger 2015, p. 27-28). 
Nevertheless, 2010 would mark a turning point in the fate of Iraq. That year, the leader 
of the Islamic State in Iraq was killed and its successor, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, began to 
rebuild the organization with loyal allies from Camp Bucca, where he had been 
detained. Many of them were Ba’athists leaders from the former regime of Saddam 
Hussein who provided ISI with the military and organizational knowledge that 
previously lacked (Ibid. p. 33-38). At the same time, Maliki’s Shia coalition in the 
Government was losing support and he turned to Iran to preserve its position in power, 
but that came at the expense of urging the US forces to leave the country in 2011 (Ibid. 
p. 27-28). According to Ryan Crocker, US ambassador to Iraq from 2007 to 2009, US 
“disengagement brought them all back to zero-sum thinking” (Crocker in Stern and 
Berger 2015, p. 29).  
ISIS had escalated its violence and Maliki, fearing that the Sunni militias could 
overthrow him, prevented Sunni members of the Awakening Movement from obtaining 
the jobs in the administration and the military that had been promised. Maliki’s 
dictatorial and sectarian rule provoked protests against his regime, which were brutally 
repressed, and radicalized Sunni Muslims who turned to ISIS (Weiss and Hassan 2015).  
Meanwhile in Syria a series of protests and the violent repression of the regime brought 
the country into a civil war in 2011. Thousands of foreign fighters from the West and 
from other Arab countries came to Syria to join one of the groups in the battlefield, 
although the vast majority were Sunni Muslims who joined the opposition. By 
September 2015, it was estimated that 30,000 foreign fighters had travelled to Syria and 
Iraq from 104 different countries, more than 6,000 of them from the West (Barrett 2015, 
p. 12; Van Ginkel and Entenmann 2016, p. 3).  
In the face of the instability in Syria, the Islamic State in Iraq took advantage of its 
porous borders and expanded its power by sending operatives to the neighboring 
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country. After al Qaeda Central disavowed ISI in 2014, due to its savage violence, its 
presence in Syria increased and the organization adopted the name ISIS (Islamic State 
in Iraq and Sham) (Ibid, p. 29-44). ISIS was really successful in his campaign and by 
the summer of 2014 the terrorist organization consolidated its control of Raqqa in Syria 
and captured Mosul in Iraq, catching by surprise the United States that had spent 
billions training and equipping the Iraqi army, which fled in the face of the ISIS attack 
(Ibid, p. 44-45).  
ISIS rapidly straddled large parts of Syria and Iraq and became infamously known 
worldwide for its violence and its tortures and executions of hostages, especially for the 
beheadings of Western prisoners that were posted online (Peresin 2015, p. 21). On 29 
June 2014, the terrorist organization proclaimed the creation of the Caliphate and 
changed its name to the Islamic State. After its proclamation, the number of Western 
foreign fighters considerably increased, especially amongst women who were lured by 
the idea of living in the Caliphate (Bakker and de Leede 2015, p. 1). ISIS brutal military 
campaign based on indiscriminate killings and enslavement of all the ethnic and 
religious groups who were not Sunni, such as the Yazidis, forced the US to take military 
action in the shape of air strikes in order to prevent an impending genocide and to 
destroy ISIS (Stern and Berger 2015, p. 46-49).  
US formed a coalition with dozens of countries to conduct air strikes against ISIS 
strongholds that have been partially effective. However, ISIS still counts with the 
support of thousands of foreign fighters and with the endorsement of the Syrian 
population, at least the Sunni Muslims, because the terrorist organization has brought 
security and normality to the lawless zones under its control (Weiss and Hassan 2015). 
Nevertheless, along with securing the territory, the new local governments have 
enforced an extremist Salafi interpretation of Sharia law based on hard punishments, 
tortures and even killings of all those who do not obey the new rules. This attitude may 
eventually raise the population against ISIS as it has happened before in other dictatorial 
regimes.  
2.1.2 Western Women in ISIS 
It is estimated that more than 6,000 Westerners have travelled to Syria or Iraq to 
become foreign fighters, surpassing the number of western foreign fighters in previous 
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conflicts. The vast majority have come from just four European countries: UK (760), 
France (1,800), Belgium (470) and Germany (760) (Barrett 2015, p. 12). Nevertheless, 
what has attracted the most international attention has been the surprisingly high 
number of women that have travelled to Syria or Iraq with their husbands, with friends 
or on their own to join ISIS; especially when the terrorist organization emphatically 
opposes that the women take part in the fight. At least 550 young women have 
reportedly gone to Syria and Iraq (Baker and De Leede 2015; Hoyle et al. 2015, p. 8).  
There have always been women involved in violent conflicts, as is the case of the Black 
Widows, a Chechen female suicide squad that committed terrorist attacks in Russia 
between 2000 and 2005. And there have previously been Western females that have 
travelled to a conflict zone, such as the Belgian citizen Malika El-Aroud, who moved 
with her husband to Afghanistan and helped al Qaeda to conduct attacks in Europe 
(Baker and De Leede 2015; Kollárová 2015).  
These examples prove that even though jihadist organizations prohibit women to 
participate in jihad in order to maintain patriarchal structures, there is evidence that 
women have assisted in logistics and as suicide bombers because, based on gendered 
expectations, they can easily pass the security checks and create less suspicion (Pearson 
2015) 
However, ISIS clearly prohibits women from participating in the battlefield and restricts 
them to their household and to marital roles. Even then, hundreds of western females 
have responded to al Baghdadi’s call for hijrah [migration] and have gone to Syria and 
Iraq (Peresin 2015, p. 23; Al 2012). ISIS aspires to create a legitimate and functioning 
state and that is the reason why it’s necessary for the terrorist organization to attract 
loyal women to populate the territories under its control and to breed the future 
generations (Jacoby 2015, p. 535). So who are these Western women who leave their 
comfortable lives in the West to join ISIS? What do they have in common?  
According to previous studies by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, the International 
Centre for the Study of Radicalization and the International Centre for Counter-
Terrorism, it is impossible to create just one profile based on age, geography, ethnicity, 
education, family relations or socioeconomic and religious background of these young 
women (Bakker and de Leede 2015; Saltman and Smith 2015; Hoyle et al. 2015). 
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Therefore, the portrayal of these women based on the stereotypes of naïve victims or 
violent extremists underestimates the different backgrounds of these girls and their 
motivations to leave their western life and travel to a war-torn territory.  
According to the studies, most of these young women are between 16 and 24 years old, 
although there are cases of younger and older women, some of them with family and 
children (Peresin and Cervone 2015). As male foreign fighters, most of them come from 
large metropolitan areas or peripheral suburbs, some from the same neighborhoods, 
which can indicate pre-existing recruiting networks or that friends have radicalized 
together as a group before leaving (Van Ginkel and Entenmann 2016). However, while 
some young women become from low-income families, others belong to well-off 
families and are well educated and with a prosperous future ahead (Peresin 2015, p. 22). 
Along these lines, some of the girls are highly educated and they have obtained 
excellent grades at school, whereas others have an IQ below average and have 
difficulties at school, therefore this is something that can affect everybody under 
determined circumstances (Ibid. p. 23). 
Most of these young women are second or third generation Muslim migrants that come 
from Muslim families that practice moderate Islam, yet some of them belong to 
conservative families or have converted to Islam during their adolescence or adulthood 
(Ibid. p. 22). Therefore, when these women radicalize, they break with their families’ 
traditions and interpretation of Islam. Most of them dress conservatively, wearing a 
niqab, a veil that covers the face, and consider that the only right path in Islam is 
through Salafism (Bakker and de Leede 2015). It must be noted that Salafism is a 
fundamentalist approach to Islam based on the literal interpretation of the Quran and 
Sunnah, and that supports the implementation of the Sharia law. However, there are 
three different approaches to Salafism and only jihadism supports violence, which 
indicates that fundamentalism, as in other religions, can be peaceful (Pearson 2015). 
Therefore, these Muslim women embrace the jihadist branch of Salafism and think that, 
in order to follow the right path of Islam, they have to travel to Syria to support in the 
creation of the so-called Caliphate.  
Some of these Western women travel with their husbands or family, as is the case of 20 
Bosnian women who went to Syria with their husbands or in order to join them; yet 
others make the journey on their own or with friends. European women have benefited 
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from the possibility to reach Syria through Turkey since European citizens do not need 
a visa to travel to the country and, once there, they just go to the border and cross it. In 
case they face any difficulties along the way, ISIS provides them with operational and 
logistic support such as contact persons and lawyers (Peresin 2015, p. 26). Nowadays, 
after the high number of foreign fighters that have gone to Syria through Turkey, 
member states security agencies have reinforced their surveillance in order to prevent 
more people to go. Some have been arrested at the airports or even before, as is the case 
of a 22-year-old convert woman in Spain who was arrested at Madrid airport when she 
was about to take a flight to Turkey, but there is still an important number of women 
who manage to reach Syria (El País 2015).  
Women’s Role in ISIS 
ISIS ambition to establish a functional state wouldn’t be possible without the presence 
of women to create households and bring up the next generation of jihadists (Peresin 
and Cervone 2015). Consequently, when the leader of ISIS proclaimed the so-called 
Caliphate in the summer of 2014, he called for women to make hijrah and travel to 
Syria and Iraq to help build the so-called Caliphate. At least 550 Europeans have heard 
his call and have left their home countries in Europe (Baker and De Leede 2015; Hoyle 
et al. 2015, p. 8). 
There is evidence that some Western women, who have joined ISIS or intend to do so, 
deploy violent narrative in the social media and some even voice their willingness to 
become fighters in Syria. However, regardless of what their intentions are before 
travelling to Syria and Iraq; once they settle in, their main role is to be a wife and a 
mother (Peresin 2015). Islamic principles argue that women and men support each other 
and thereby women’s role is complementary and cooperative with the men’s role, 
instead of equal and competitive. A fundamentalist interpretation of this principle leads 
to gender segregation and role division; positioning women within family and home and 
men as breadwinners and fighters (Zakaria 2015; Pearson 2015). ISIS has established 
gender segregation in every sphere of women’s life and it has made clear what Western 
female Muslims can expect to do when they arrive.  
In two documents, one of the Al-Khansaa brigade and the other by a woman called Al, 
ISIS explains that women’s main responsibility is to support their husbands and raise 
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their children in the path of jihad by encouraging their love ones to join the fight 
(Winter 2015; Al 2012). Additionally, women should be educated in Islam and trained 
in self-defense to be able to instruct their children in both fields. Certain women are 
allowed to leave their homes to serve society as doctors or teachers, and a reduced 
number are reportedly trained to be part of the Al-Khansaa or the Umm Al-Rayan 
brigades who are in charge of policing women’s compliance of Sharia law and 
disciplining those who don’t follow the guidelines by using brutal methods (Jacoby 
2015, p. 535-536; Peresin 2015, p. 31; Winter 2015; Al 2012). However, not all of them 
can expect to have these types of jobs because they don’t know the local language. The 
only additional role to be a good mother and wife is to become a recruiter of other 
Western foreign fighters and female companions in the social media. 
Life in the so-called Caliphate is not as wonderful as Western women think before 
leaving their countries, and as it is portray in social media. Women cannot leave the 
house without a male escort, hairdressers are forbidden, drinking, smoking and 
gambling are not allowed and all businesses have to close during prayers (Weiss and 
Hassan 2015, p. 217-218). Moving around without being married is practically 
impossible and unmarried women have to reside in all-female hostels that they cannot 
abandon without a chaperone. Consequently, most Western female Muslims are advised 
to arrange a marriage upon arrival in order to make life easier when they reach Syria or 
Iraq, and they are also encouraged to accept the death of their husbands as an honor 
(Peresin 2015; Saltman and Smith 2015, p. 16). 
Western women receive a monthly allowance and free housing when they come to the 
so-called Caliphate and they obtain extra money for each child they have, promoting 
pregnancies and deliveries in really bad conditions. ISIS pays Westerners and foreign 
fighters with the hidden intention of preventing them from leaving the territory. 
However, this situation is unsustainable in the long term and has unleashed resentment 
within the local communities (Peresin 2015, p. 29). 
Marital life is not easy either, a former member of the Al-Khansaa brigade confirmed in 
an interview on CNN that some Western women suffer sexual violence at the hands of 
their husbands (Ibid. p. 28). In addition, Western females become witnesses and 
accomplices of the savage ISIS campaign of sexual enslavement and mass rape of 
enemy women, of the systematic beheadings of hostages and enemies, and of other 
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customary brutalities of war (Binetti 2015). When they become widows, they are 
supposed to be remarried again after the period of mourning and despite some women 
praise to be treated perfectly while they are widows, others claim to be abandoned and 
forgotten (Hoyle et al. 2015, p. 39; Saltman and Smith 2015, p. 24) 
Leaving ISIS has been harder than joining the terrorist group since all the Western 
women had to hand over their western passports upon arrival. In addition, those willing 
to leave will be deterred and threaten by ISIS members and will be discouraged by the 
probability of being arrested and prosecuted when they return to their home country 
(Peresin and Cervone 2015, p. 496; Zakaria 2015). According to some families, some 
young women have become disappointed and disillusioned and claim to have made the 
biggest mistake of their life. However, others have rejected their families’ help assuring 
that they are happier than ever in the so-called Caliphate (Peresin 2015).  
2.1.3 Female Muslims in Europe 
In the past years there has been an increase of racially motivated crimes in Europe that 
have been reinforced by an anti-migrant rhetoric in the media and in the political arena, 
triggered to some extent by the economic crisis in Europe (Nwabuzo 2014). There are 
different ethnic and religious groups suffering from racial discrimination and violence 
around Europe, yet Muslims are the ones facing a major threat, especially after the 
jihadist terrorist attacks in France and Belgium in 2015 and early 2016 (Collectif Contre 
l’Islamophobie en France 2016). In France, social cohesion has been damaged by the 
fear of suffering other terrorist attacks, the exploitation of this fear for political 
purposes, and the impact of this situation on the Muslims citizens who are being held 
directly or indirectly accountable for it (Ibid. p. 8). This climate of anxiety and 
discrimination against Muslims is also widely spread in Europe to a greater or lesser 
extent and it is based in a political discourse that defends a “lack of compatibility 
between some expressions of Islam with ‘European values’, i.e. fundamental rights, the 
rule of law and women’s rights in particular” (Seta 2016, p. 3).  
The Collective against Islamophobia in France (CCIF) considers Islamophobia as: 
 A dual definition that includes, the trivialization and accumulation of 
discourses and prejudices that demonize Islam and Muslims [and] all acts of 
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rejection, discrimination or violence against institutions or individuals on the 
basis of their real or perceived belonging to the Muslim faith.  
(Collectif Contre l’Islamophobie en France 2016, p. 16).  
Female Muslims in Europe suffer Islamophobic acts in different areas of their life 
because of their religion, ethnic origin and gender, which can result into low self-
esteem, isolation, exclusion, and in some cases into radicalization (Seta 2016, p. 11). 
Muslim women are victims of gender inequality as other women, but they face other 
inequalities based on ethnicity and perceived religion as well. Consequently, they 
account for 75% of the victims of Islamophobic acts in France (Collectif Contre 
l’Islamophobie en France, 2016, p. 24). However, between 53% and 98% of these 
women, depending on the European state of residence, did not fill a complaint at the 
police station (Seta 2016, p. 11). In France, only 20% of the victims of Islamophobia 
reported it, mainly because there is a “lack of an institutional acknowledgement of 
Islamophobia, [which] contributes indirectly to the trivialization and normalization of 
this racism” (Collectif Contre l’Islamophobie en France, 2016, p. 18-19).  
According to a survey of CCIF, only 26% of French citizens admitted having a positive 
opinion about Islam and close to half of the interviewees declared Islamic practices to 
be a barrier for the unity in France. Muslim women are perceived even worse since 79% 
of French citizens consider the veil to be an obstacle for living cordially in France (Ibid. 
p. 18-24). The same happens in other countries such as the UK, where a Gallup research 
shows that 30% of the participants consider the hijab a threat, although 41% associated 
it with confidence and 37% thought it was an enrichment of European culture (Seta 
2016, p. 15). The discourse around the use of the female dress code in the public sphere 
has reinforced the exclusion of Muslim women who are depicted as oppressed victims 
instead of as agents, maintaining in this way the patriarchal views. For instance, 64% of 
Swedish citizens consider Muslim women to be oppressed (Seta 2016, p. 13-15).  
Discrimination based on religion, gender, ethnicity or a combination of all is also 
visible in the labor market. According to a report of the European Network Against 
Racism (Seta 2016), a research in France shows that a woman perceived to be Muslim 
because of the name has 2.5 times less chance to obtain a job interview than other 
women, and when they are wearing a headscarf, they have to send an average of 71% 
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more applications. In a research in the UK the results are similar; a Muslim woman has 
to send 74% more applications than a white woman to be accepted in a job. In Belgium 
or Italy the likelihood of receiving an affirmative answer is 50% less if the woman’s 
name is Arabic. And in the Netherlands, a survey showed that only 11% of Afghani-
Dutch Muslim women suffer discrimination, whereas a 73% did if they were wearing a 
headscarf (Ibid. p. 17-18). Results around Europe show that Muslim women suffer from 
discrimination based on ethnicity and religion, and that the chance to get a job is even 
harder if the women wear the Islamic veil, even if it is a hijab. EU legislations for 
employment equality guarantees a framework that prohibits any kind of direct or 
indirect discrimination, harassment or violence on the grounds of religion or race, 
however these episodes prevail. 
Racist violence happens mainly offline, however online hate speech is increasing in 
social media such as Facebook or Twitter, especially against those Muslims that can be 
perceived as fundamentalist or ISIS supporters (Ibid. p. 27). Western countries and 
social media have double standards when it comes to suspending people because of the 
use of hate speech. While the accounts of ISIS supporters are constantly deleted due to 
hate speech and terrorism exaltation, it is easy to find verbal abuse and hate speech 
against female Muslims who support ISIS and whose accounts have been deleted.  
Suffering from discrimination in your own home country can have a detrimental effect 
for young female Muslims who face identity problems and who can become radicalized 
with narratives that highlight Islamophobia in Europe. However, it cannot be assumed 
that female Muslims’ violent radicalization happens because of the discrimination that 
they suffer in their countries, since only a small number of Muslim women have joined 
ISIS.  
2.2 Theoretical Framework of Violent Radicalization  
In this section of the literature review the theoretical framework will be explained. This 
study is anchored on two main theories of violent radicalization that complement each 
other. The main one is framing theory, which belongs to the Social Movement Theory 
(SMT), and has been postulated by scholars such as Quintan Wiktorowicz. The second 
theory is anchored in the French sociological tradition, to which Gilles Kepel, Farhad 
Khosrokhavar, Olivier Roy and Akil N. Awan belong. In addition, this paper is based 
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on the study “‘Till Martyrdom Do Us Part’ Gender and the ISIS Phenomenon” of the 
Institute for Strategic Dialogue, where several push and pull factors are identified 
(Saltman and Smith 2015).  
There is little consensus among scholars and governments about the definition of 
radicalization, as well as of other concepts such as terrorism or extremism. These 
concepts are sometimes conflated, misleading the interpretation and understanding of 
the phenomenon of violent radicalization (Sedgwick 2010, p. 483–484). 
Acknowledging these differences, this research employs the concept of ‘Radicalization 
into Violent Extremism’ (RVE) postulated by Randy Borum (2011). This concept refers 
to the progressive adoption of beliefs that justify and compel violence, as well as the 
process undergone from thinking to action (Ibid. p. 8). The author explains that having 
radical ideas does not imply supporting the use of violence and accepting violence and 
terrorism does not mean having deep radical beliefs. Therefore, adopting extremist ideas 
that justify violence is a radicalization process, but not the only path to terrorism (Ibid. 
p. 8). 
This research focuses on the violent radicalization process of Western female Muslims 
that have joined ISIS, using the term ‘violent radicalization’ as synonym of Borum’s 
concept ‘Radicalization into Violent Extremism’ (Ibid.). Violent radicalization is 
understood as a dynamic process, the product of several decisions and factors that push 
an individual towards the acceptance of determined beliefs and the commitment to 
violence over time. This pathway and the mechanisms that push someone to commit to 
violence can be different for each person. Thus, it is difficult to find one single 
theoretical model that explains this process and the best approach is to combine several 
theories to obtain a more comprehensive understanding of violent radicalism (Ibid. p. 
15).  
2.2.1 Social Movement Theory and Framing Theory 
Social Movement Theories can be useful to understand violent radicalization because 
they conceive it as a group process, focusing on broader dynamics and not on socio-
demographic variables (Borum 2011; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2008). Among the different 
approaches to Social Movement Theory, Framing Theory provides a coherent 
framework for this research by combining structural, meso- and individual levels of 
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analysis (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2008). The key principle of Framing Theory is that reality is 
a social construction where various frames, understood as values and beliefs, compete 
to establish themselves as the interpretation of this socially constructed reality. 
Therefore, the success of a social movement resides in his ability to create and 
disseminate coherent and convincing frames to attract potential recruits. When an 
individual’s values, beliefs and interest are congruent, scholars refer to this process as 
‘frame alignment’ (Borum 2011; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010, 2008).   
Framing Theory explains violent radicalization through the distinct constructed 
reality, shared by members of violent groups – a constructed reality or world 
view, which frames problems as not just misfortunes, but injustices, attributes 
responsibility for these “injustices”, and constructs an argument for the efficacy 
and/or moral justification of using violence against civilians to right the perceive 
wrong.  
(Dalgaard-Nielsen 2008, p. 7) 
Thus, framing theory is useful to explain how ISIS has been able to attract thousands of 
people by creating a framed narrative, or propaganda, that justifies attacking its 
enemies, especially the West. In addition, its strong propaganda machinery and active 
recruitment through social media can also be explained by Quintan Wiktorowicz model 
of social violent radicalization, where the process is done socially within a small group 
of people (Ibid.). Social media have facilitated the radicalization among users and 
despite seeming to be an individual process; these people maintain direct or indirect 
communications through their postings, making this radicalization a social process.  
Wiktorowicz has established a four-stage model of violent radicalization, which concurs 
with empirical researches about Western Islamist movements. (Wiktorowicz in 
Dalgaard-Nielsen 2008, p.7) First, the individual goes through a process of cognitive 
opening, showing openness to a new worldview. In this phase the discussions are 
focused on mainstream themes such as Muslims discrimination or Arab conflicts. 
Secondly, the individual chooses the path of religion to find meaning and 
understanding, entering into the phase of religious seeking where the individual is 
progressively presented with the violent narrative. Thirdly, the individual aligns its 
ideas, beliefs and interests with the social movement, which is referred as frame 
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alignment. Finally, once the individual shares the same frames, he goes through a 
process of socialization where he moves from thinking to action and actively join the 
group (Borum 2011, p.18-19; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010, 2008).  
Therefore, violent radicalization is understood as a social process that results from the 
interaction with a radical group that supports violence. According to Neumman and 
Rogers, social bonding within a small group or with peers can ease the adoption of 
violent radical views (Neumman and Rogers in Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010, p. 803). Young 
women are befriended online by other women or in some cases men, and are treated 
with kind words and affection to create that bond (Binetti 2015).  
However, Framing Theory has too little focus on the individual level of analysis to 
explain why only a minority of all those exposed to the same frames align with the 
movement, in this case ISIS (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2008). The coherence of ISIS’s narrative 
is not sufficient to account for the huge number of foreign fighters and muhajirat, 
women that have migrated to Syria and Iraq; and the role of individual agency must be 
taken also into account (Awan 2015, p. 59) 
2.2.2 Dual Cultural Alterity 
In order to shed light on why only some people are lured by ISIS’s narrative, this 
research relies on the French sociology tradition and the concept of dual cultural 
alterity introduced by Akil N. Awan (Awan 2015).   
Gilles Kepel, Olivier Roy and Farhad Khosrokhavar, scholars in French sociological, 
distance themselves from classical socio-demographic conditions and contribute to 
explain why violent radicalization attracts both Europeans from lower social strata and 
well-off members of society (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010, p. 799-800). 
Their main tenet is that the conditions of modernity, individualization and value 
relativism in Western countries draw some individuals into a search for identity, 
meaning, and community belonging (Ibid. p. 799). This is especially true in the case of 
second or third generation Muslims in Europe who have been raised in Western values 
and have embraced its lifestyle to the extent of no longer feeling part of their parents’ 
culture and Islamic tradition. At the same time, however, they can experience 
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discrimination and socioeconomic disadvantages based on their religion, ethnicity and 
gender, especially in the case of women (Roy 2007, p. 52-53; Khosrokhavar 2008; 
Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010, p. 800). Wiktorowicz also shares this conceptualization of 
‘grievances’, considering them a precursor of radicalization; which shows a connection 
between these two theories (Pearson 2015).   
Therefore, European female Muslims can experience a double sense of non-belonging, 
of otherness, and of alienation both form their parents’ culture and the mainstream 
Western culture, that Akil Awan labels ‘dual cultural alterity’ (Awan 2015, p. 62) 
Muslim women constantly renegotiate a variety of identities imposed on them by their 
families and communities, and the wider society (Person 2015, p. 14). Their inability or 
unwillingness to fulfill the expectations of these groups and vice versa, generates a 
feeling of uprooting and disenchantment that leads them to search for identity, meaning 
and community belonging. In this process, some resort to religion as their principal 
anchor of identity and they can encounter ISIS narrative as a solution. This seems to be 
the only psychological trait commonly shared by Western Muslims who joined ISIS 
(Awan 2015, p. 62-63; Roy 2015).  
According to Roy and Khosrokhavar, the two main approaches of migrant integration, 
which are the British multiculturalism, where Muslims are defined by their ethno-
cultural identities, and the French ‘assimilationnisme’, where Muslims are supposed to 
be part of society without the interference of any community, have failed because both 
consider religion to be embedded in culture, instead of considering it as a mere faith 
(Roy 2007, p. 56; Khosrokhavar 2008). Nevertheless, Roy does not consider the poor 
integration to be the reason why Western Muslims travel to Syria, but it prompts 
receptiveness in lost Muslims who are reconstructing their identity, and is the excuse 
used by ISIS to justify violence against the West (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010, p. 800). 
2.2.3 Framing Hijrah 
After explaining how the violent radicalization process develops, and why only some 
people are lured by ISIS narrative, this paper focuses on which are the frames used by 
ISIS to attract women to Syria and Iraq. This part of the literature review uses the study 
“‘Till Martyrdom Do Us Part’ Gender and the ISIS Phenomenon” of the Institute for 
Strategic Dialogue as a cornerstone to identify women’s reasons to do hijrah, migration, 
 17 
to join ISIS. They differentiate between ‘push factors’, which are the reasons why 
Western women see their own home countries as a hostile enemy, and ‘pull factors’, 
which are those aspects that attract them from the Caliphate. In addition, other articles 
and studies are included to have a wider spectrum of motives. These ‘reasons’ are 
framed narratives disseminated by ISIS recruiters and embraced by Western women 
who have become radicalized and, some of whom have already made the journey to the 
so-called Caliphate.   
Some of ISIS frames are based on pre-existing narratives widely supported by the 
Muslim community; the difference is that the terrorist group legitimizes the use of 
violence to change the world and to support their fundamentalist views (Jacoby 2015). 
ISIS propaganda is produced in detail and the terrorist organization has increased its 
female-tailored narrative by, for example, including them in the production and 
dissemination of the frames, as recruiters, and even allowing them to write a section 
called ‘to our sisters’ in the official ISIS magazine, Dabiq (Saltman and Smith 2015). 
ISIS’s use of social media is extremely effective in helping people redefine their 
identity and adopt a binary narrative of ‘us versus them’, common in the Salafist 
discourse, where all those who do not support ISIS are considered the enemy. Their 
discourse is also characterized by the use of belligerent language. The lack of neutral 
sources in Syria has benefited ISIS in the depiction of the so-called ‘Caliphate’ as an 
ideal place to live. Western women already living in Syria or Iraq post pictures showing 
how good their lives are there, and write blogs about it (Peresin and Cervone 2015).   
Push Factors 
Self-identity in Europe 
Is widely agreed in the academic field that young people experience an identity 
formation during their adolescence and early adulthood, and in the case of European 
Muslim women the process can be more difficult since they are exposed to a variety of 
identities that are imposed to them by the mainstream society, the patriarchal norms of 
Muslim communities and the cultural traditions of their families (Pearson 2015, p. 14) 
The different values and interpretations of female roles could lead Muslim women to 
experience a process of ‘dual cultural alterity’, a sense of non-belonging to both the 
mainstream Western culture and the culture of their parents, that makes them more 
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vulnerable to extremist narratives as an alternative to the previous ones (Awan 2015). 
The lack of belonging to neither of the communities and the search for a new identity 
has led some of the women to find that alternative in the extremist narrative of Salafism. 
ISIS ideology has become this third path that offers them a new identity clearly defined, 
a sense of belonging to a global cause, the Ummah, and a feeling of acceptance within 
the new group that they could previously lack because of discrimination (Peresin 2015, 
p. 25). ISIS is aware of the tribulations that some Muslims may face and encourage 
them to make hijrah because as one sister explains in Dabiq magazine, “getting used to 
seeing kufr [infidel] and shirk without changing it could lead to death of the heart, to the 
point that the person does not recognize Islam and its people” (Umm Sumayyah Al-
Muhajirah 2015, p. 32-37). ISIS takes advantage of the vulnerability and the 
confronting identities that European Muslim women are expected to adopt, and it 
attributes these feelings to the fact of living in a country with non-believers morally 
corrupted where the principles of Islam are not respected. Consequently, ISIS claims 
that the only way Muslims can profess their faith is by leaving the land of “infidels”.  
Discrimination in Europe 
In correlation with the feelings of non-belonging based on identity alienation, Muslims 
immigrants have suffered an increase of xenophobia and discrimination, especially after 
the economic crisis and the several terrorist attacks occurred in Europe. Discrimination 
has fed the pre-existing feelings of cultural and social isolation and it has boosted the 
aspirations of some Muslims to travel to Syria, where they perceive that they can live 
their faith without being discriminated (Peresin and Cervone 2015, p. 500). 
Consequently, ISIS and jihadist Salafism have taken advantage of the wrongdoings of 
European societies to blame them for all the situations of exclusion, without considering 
the possibility of personal failing of integration (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010, p. 800).  
Furthermore, Muslim women are more vulnerable to discrimination because they 
experience it based on their ethnicity and religion, as well as on their gender, accounting 
for 74% of the victims of discrimination (Collectif Contre l’Islamophobie en France, 
2016). As previously explained, the use of the veil as a symbol of faith has caused them 
even more discrimination in their jobs and in the public sphere where they have suffered 
verbal and physical violence (Seta 2016, p. 17-18). The restrictions on conservative 
 19 
dressing code, such as the full veil, make them feel unable to express their faith and 
themselves in their own country, fostering the alienation from Western society.  
The Ummah under attack  
The concept of Ummah is a constructed imaginary that comprises all the Muslim 
community around the world, eliminating identities based on culture, ethnicity or 
nationalism and adopting a meta-identity based on the faith; creating in this way a 
global community of belief (Saltman and Smith 2015).  
Jihadist narrative claims that the Ummah is currently being attacked worldwide by 
portraying the contemporary conflicts as part of a wider historical global attack against 
Islam. ISIS and its supporters employ historical terms such as ‘Zionist’ or ‘Cruzader’ to 
refer to Israel and Western countries and release violent videos and photos of women 
and children to reinforce the narrative and create a coherent and consistent discourse 
that can be maintained over time. The imaginary of the Ummah is one of the main 
cornerstones of ISIS propaganda since it justifies the extremist interpretation of global 
conflicts and promotes the violent radicalization and polarization of society (Awan 
2015, p. 57-69; Saltman and Smith 2015, p. 11). Therefore, the so-called Islamic State 
is depicted as a safe haven where Muslims can freely live their faith, without suffering 
discrimination based on their ethnicity or religion.  
According to some studies, Muslim suffering and the complicity that is believed to exist 
among Western powers to perpetuate these conflicts are two major keystones in the 
decision of Western female Muslims to leave the West and join ISIS, in order to help 
those in need (Hoyle et al. 2015).  
Pull factors 
Sisterhood belonging 
The promotion of the female community that women have created in the so-called 
Caliphate is another major keystone in ISIS propaganda. As Akil Awan explains, some 
people, especially women from minority ethnicities and religions, can experience a dual 
cultural alterity, a double sense of otherness and lack of belonging to the society or 
their families’ traditions that make them more vulnerable to extremist narratives that 
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offer them a feeling of belonging, unity and community in ISIS (Awan 2015, p. 63; 
Saltman and Smith 2015). 
Some European Muslim women have created very strong relationships with others who 
have already joined ISIS or have the intention to do so, and in some cases this violent 
radicalization process occurs in a group. According to Pearson, group dynamics can 
intensify radicalization processes and in the real world, as in the Internet, women have 
created strong bonds among them and a community of sisters where ISIS’s ideology is 
reinforced and supported (Pearson 2015).  
European Muslim women are more encouraged to take the decision of abandoning their 
families in the West because they know that there are true friends waiting for them 
when they make hijrah to Syria. They have such a strong relationship with them that 
they become like sisters and in the process of violent radicalization, they reject other 
friendships with Westerners because are considered fake and frivolous (Saltman and 
Smith 2015, p. 15).  
Religious duty and state building 
After the proclamation of the so-called Caliphate, ISIS claimed that it was incumbent on 
all Muslims to make hijrah to help defend and restore the ‘state of Allah’ (Awan 2015, 
p.59). Consequently, hundreds of Western women, both married and unmarried, decided 
to travel to Syria believing that making hijrah was a religious duty and therefore crucial 
to secure their place in heaven in the afterlife (Hoyle et al. 2015, p. 13). Thus, following 
ISIS’ dichotomous thinking, both men and women have no option but to travel to Syria 
if they have the capacity to do so, in order to be considered good Muslims in the face of 
Allah.  
The binary discourse employed in ISIS propaganda makes it easier for sympathizers to 
radicalize and embrace its principles. As an example, Umm Sumayyah al-Muhajirah, 
author of the articles addressed to women in the official ISIS magazine, Dabiq, depicts 
the Caliphate as a green land of light and life and the rest of the world as a place full of 
darkness and death (Umm Sumayyah Al-Muhajirah 2015). Therefore, radicalized 
European Muslim women believe that the only way of being a good Muslim and 
earning a place in Paradise is by travelling to the so-called Caliphate.  
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Travelling to the purported Caliphate is not only a religious duty, but it also offers 
Muslims the possibility of living their faith under a strict interpretation of the Sharia 
law, which is not allowed in European countries where democratic values prevail 
(Peresin 2015, p. 24). The possibility of living in an Islamic state and taking part in the 
state building process has attracted many people, especially those who have gone 
through a process of identity search and community engagement, and that have 
subscribed to the extremist narratives of ISIS. The so-called Caliphate offers them a 
community that accepts them and a purpose in life where their identity and job-role are 
clearly defined. 
Western women already living in the territory try to lure others by sharing their personal 
life experiences in the purported Caliphate through their social media, offering a 
positive and attractive depiction of the life under ISIS’ rule (Ibid.). These views are 
distorted and life in the Syria is not as perfect as they portray, however many seem to 
believe that life is better there and decide to migrate.  
Financial Security 
According to Barbara F. Walter, women may join ISIS in order to obtain the financial 
security that may be difficult to have in Europe. The monthly salary they receive and 
the incentives for having children could be an important factor to migrate to Syria and 
marry a foreign fighter, because it guarantees them that they will be well taken care of 
(Walter 2015). After the economic crisis, many people have experienced financial 
insecurity because of their economic situation, and this is especially true in Western 
female Muslims who experience discrimination and have fewer chances to obtain a job 
than white Christian people. According to a survey of Muslim women, the more 
anxious they were about their economic future, the more likely they would support 
religious fundamentalism (Walter 2015). Therefore, the economic security offered by a 
marriage in the so-called Caliphate could be an option for those who fear that marriage 
in the West will not offer them better economic prospects.  
Marriage 
Arranged marriage is a rooted tradition in Islam and it symbolizes the transition from 
childhood to adulthood. Consequently, some women decide to go to Syria to get 
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married, not because of the financial security it may offer, but in order to escape from 
their parental control and to start a new life on their own (Bakker and de Leede 2015; 
Saltman and Smith 2015, p. 16). Getting married with a jihadist is considered by ISIS 
supporters as a blessing and is glorified in the social media with pictures of lions and 
lioness, symbolizing strength and support (Saltman and Smith 2015, p. 16). For Western 
female Muslims who have gone through a violent radicalization process and praise 
jihadists and their bravery fighting for the Caliphate, getting married to one of them is 
an honor and a privilege.  
The marriage with a jihadist also includes the possibility of becoming a widow at a 
young age, however, ISIS recruiters encourage women to embrace the martyrdom of 
their husbands as a privilege since it will guarantee both of them a better place in 
heaven (Ibid. p. 16). Therefore, martyrdom gives an added value to getting married, 
which is what is expected from a devout Muslim woman according to the extremist 
narratives of ISIS.  
Marriage is one of the pillars of ISIS’ state-building ambitions because it perpetuates 
the traditional social forms and their supporters use marriage to promote the procreation 
and the breeding of children as future muhajideen (fighters). Consequently, ISIS 
recruiters advise women to arrange their marriage before they travel to Syria because it 
will make their lives easier since unmarried women have more restrictions (Hoyle et al. 
2015, p. 13; Peresin 2015, p. 29; Saltman and Smith 2015, p. 16). Thus, women’s main 
role in the purported Caliphate is to be mothers and some women may be lured by this 
opportunity of motherhood. 
Adventure 
Another motive that women have to make hijrah is the adventurous and heroic 
experience that they believe ISIS offers them. Despite not being allowed to fight or take 
part in the battlefield, some women are drawn by the allure of being part of an 
organization that claims to be changing the world. They believe that joining ISIS will 
grant them empowerment and exciting and meaningful lives (Peresin 2015). However, 
they are not aware that the idealized depiction of the life in the so-called Caliphate is 
completely biased and some may gradually become disenchanted over time. 
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Western Muslim women have adhered to these frames to a great extent and they use 
them to explain why they made hijrah and joined ISIS. However, there are also some 
discrepancies and those able to contact their families or even escape, claim to have 
made the biggest mistake of their lives (Ibid.).  
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3 Methodological Framework 
This research aims at investigating “Why European women decide to leave their home 
countries and move to Syria and Iraq to join ISIS?” The unprecedented high number of 
European and Western females that have travelled to join ISIS, a terrorist group, has 
become a new phenomenon that has drawn the attention of scholars who has previously 
focused on men when investigating violent radicalization and foreign fighters. Thus, 
this particular field of study has until recently been under-researched and the main goal 
of this thesis is to expand upon the existing studies that focus on the paradox of Western 
female Muslims’ migration to join ISIS by proposing a consistent theoretical framework 
and contributing to the analysis of the social media profiles of some ISIS members.  
The study is anchored in the theory of science termed social constructivism, which 
states that reality is socially constructed and is based on the interpretation of the 
individuals. The theories employed in this research are delimited within constructivism 
and further substantiate that Western female Muslims interpret reality in a way in which 
travelling to Syria to join ISIS is not only accepted but utterly desired. Similarly, the 
methodology used in this research is bounded within the framework of social 
constructivism.  
3.1 Research Design 
In order to answer the above-mentioned thesis statement, this research aims at analyzing 
a small sample of European Muslim women who have travelled to Syria to join ISIS. 
The theoretical framework presented in the previous chapter is the backbone of the 
analysis and it has been used in the definition of three hypotheses, which are going to be 
used to create a coherent analytical strategy. Consequently, the results from the analysis 
that is explained in this chapter will be utilized to shed light on this new phenomenon, 
and on the role that the social media as a radicalization tool, which will be explained in 
the discussion chapter.  
The analysis examines the motives that women have to join ISIS and travel to Syria to 
live in the so-called Caliphate, as well as the relationships between them in order to 
understand the radicalization process. The analysis will be focused on the social media 
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accounts of these women, but it will also take into consideration several articles about 
women who have returned or were stopped before leaving. The reason why this 
research uses their posts in the social media is based on their refusal to give interviews 
to journalists or researchers, which makes more complicated to understand the 
phenomenon.  
To analyze this case, the research employs the methodology termed mixed methods, 
which combines qualitative and quantitative approaches in order to capitalize the 
strengths in data-collection and data-analysis of each method and offset their 
weaknesses (Bryman 2012, p. 628). Thus, the qualitative study intends to provide a 
broader understanding of the context where the results of the quantitative study have 
been obtained (Ibid. p. 654).  
Consequently, the research combines quantitative and qualitative content analysis in 
order to provide a better understanding of this phenomenon (Hsieh and Shannon 2005, 
p. 1278). The quantitative content analysis systematically quantifies data while the 
qualitative approach offers a subjective interpretation of that content that has been 
classified and coded according to previously defined themes and categories (Ibid. p. 
1278). Thus, this analysis establishes several categories in order to identify and interpret 
the patterns and themes in the posts, as well as the language used by the women.  
The quantitative and qualitative content analysis of the posts is used to confirm or reject 
the three hypotheses that have been deduced from the theoretical framework explained 
in the previous chapter. 
The concepts and precepts form the theoretical framework have been operationalized to 
produce three hypotheses that help answering the question posed in the research. All the 
hypotheses depart from the assumption that the women who travel to Syria have 
experienced feelings of non-belonging that led them to reshape their identity; and, in the 
process of doing so, they became radicalized as is posited by authors such as Roy, 
Kepel, Khosrokhavar and Awan. However, this research does not aim at analyzing how 
the feeling of non-belonging and the identity search work since it would require a 
psychological approach and that would deviate the research from its original intention. 
Therefore, this paper embraces the theory and precepts of these authors, which have 
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been underpinned by qualitative interviews with small samples of individuals 
(Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010, p. 799).  
Hypothesis 1: European female Muslims make hijrah because they have perceived 
grievances against Europe 
The hypothesis one is based on the Framing Theory posited by Wiktorowicz and 
explained by Dalgaard-Nielsen (2008) and the ‘push factors’ identified by Saltman and 
Smith (2015). These perceived grievances are the frames disseminated by ISIS that 
identify and justify the reasons why the home countries are considered hostile.  
To examine hypothesis number one, the study pays attention to the categories related to 
women’s grievances such as the feeling of non-belonging, discrimination or the 
perceived persecution of the Muslim community, in other words, the posts that mention 
the negative perceptions about the West that may have driven European women to leave 
their home countries. Through a quantitative and qualitative approach, this research 
identifies if there is a salient reason among the different grievances and how ISIS 
frames are embraced and used by European Muslim women in their social media. 
 Hypothesis 2: European female Muslims make hijrah because they believe it is a 
religious duty and ISIS offers them community belonging, security and a purpose 
in life.  
Hypothesis two is also based on the Framing Theory, but in this case it refers to the 
‘pull factors’, a concept used by Saltman and Smith (2015).  
As in the previous hypothesis, in order to confirm or reject hypothesis two the content 
analysis will examine which are the reasons that seduced them to join the so-called 
Caliphate. Thus, it includes motives such as the religious duty, the state building 
ambitions, marriage, the feeling of sisterhood belonging, the financial security or the 
adventure. Combining the quantitative and qualitative approach of the content analysis, 
this research identifies if there are salient reasons and examines how women portray the 
purported Caliphate, aligning their frames about it with ISIS propaganda.  
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Hypothesis 3: Group radicalization in the social media fosters European women’s 
migration to the so-called Caliphate  
Hypothesis three is based on both the Social Movement Theory and the Framing Theory 
since it departs from the assumption that the radicalization process in the social media 
through group or peer-to-peer interaction encourages and facilitates the violent 
radicalization of these women and the migration to the so-called Caliphate.  
To confirm or reject the hypothesis number three the communications between these 
women and other people, as well as the content and the language used in the posts are 
identified and examined. This research pays special attention to the posts where the 
women are actively recruiting someone else or giving important information about how 
to migrate. Shedding light into the communication dynamics is important because some 
of them are acting as recruiters of other women who are considering the option of 
making hijrah. Several news articles about women who made hijrah and have returned, 
or who were stopped before doing so by their family further back the results of the 
analysis in relation to the hypothesis number three. These interviews contain an 
important insight on the secret relations and contacts between these women and their 
recruiters, as well as an explanation of how their process of violent radicalization 
happened. Due to the small sample of cases and the impossibility to analyze their 
interviews with the same analytical strategy, this information is only used to back the 
results obtained from the analysis.  
These three hypotheses have been deduced from the theory and, in combination, they 
give a coherent and holistic answer to the research question, “Why European women 
decide to leave their home countries and move to Syria and Iraq to join ISIS?” The first 
two hypotheses aim at understanding the motives why women make hijrah, whereas the 
hypothesis three aims at explaining the role of the social media, which is a cornerstone 
in the violent radicalization process of these women, especially of young girls or 
coverts. The hypothesis three is necessary in order to understand the broad picture of 
radicalization and how the group or peer-to-peer pressure can affect the decision to 
make hijrah.  
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3.2 Method 
As previously mentioned, the method employed in the research is the quantitative and 
qualitative content analysis. Each of the approaches will offer a different perspective 
that combined will enable to have a holistic image of the motives that European Muslim 
women had to join ISIS. It is necessary to understand these motives and reasons in order 
to be able to create an efficient counter-narrative. Likewise, is necessary to examine the 
role of the social media since it is an efficient tool for violent radicalization, and 
therefore for countering it.  
3.2.1 Data collection 
The data collection process is divided into three different phases due to the difficulty of 
finding information directly on the social media after Twitter shut down more than 
125,000 jihadists’ accounts (Broomfield 2016) and other platforms followed suit.  
Consequently, this research examines different platforms such as newspapers, online 
articles, studies, and the social media in order to get as much information and posts as 
possible. The period of investigation goes from January 2012 to the end of May 2016 in 
order to cover the period of occurrence of the phenomenon widely. 
The first phase consists in a systematic search in the selected newspapers of the 
keywords ‘Islamic State’, ‘État Islamique’ in French, in order to identify articles about 
European females who have left their home country to join ISIS. Considering that most 
of the women come from the United Kingdom, France and Belgium, the selected 
newspapers are the most prominent ones in each country: The Guardian (UK), Le 
Monde (France) and Le Soir (Belgium). In this phase, the names, usernames and other 
relevant information of these women is collected, as well as all their social media posts, 
which are the unit of analysis of this research.  
Only original content produced by these women in the form of text, original photos or 
non-original photos with comments are used in the analysis. This includes their 
statements and those religious passages that contain personal comments. In reference to 
the non-original photos, shared or uploaded ones are not taken into account, unless they 
have a comment from the woman posting them. Furthermore, only complete quotes or 
screenshots of the posts have been retrieved from the newspaper articles to guarantee 
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that there are not taken out of context. Posts that are not literally transcribed have not 
been used as a unit of analysis. In the case of Twitter, the posts that are a continuation 
of previous ones have been considered all together as just one post since the only reason 
why they are separated is the 140 characters restriction in this social media.  
Once that information is collected, the second phase that consists in searching for more 
posts through the web by typing the women’s names and usernames in the search 
engine. Due to the media shut down, is really difficult to find any posts on Tumblr, 
Ask.fm or Twitter. Therefore, previous studies about the same topic will be examined in 
order to collect more posts and quotes for the analysis. As in the previous phase, only 
literal quotes or screenshots will be taken into consideration.  
Finally, on the third phase the snowfall sampling technique has been employed in the 
social media in order to finding these women by association with others. It is an 
effective technique to identify a small group among the large amount of accounts, and it 
is helpful to find the new profiles of these women, who normally create new ones and 
try to recover their followers and friends. However, it must be pointed out that the 
presence of these women on the social media has largely reduced because of the 
continuous deletion of their accounts, the fact that they live in a war-torn territory where 
internet connection fails and, especially, because ISIS has banned the use of Wi-Fi or 
internet connection at home for security reasons (Aljazeera 2015). 
By taking this approach, the research has collected a total of 586 posts from the 
different social media. As previously mentioned, some Twitter posts have been 
combined when they are the continuation of a previous one. Therefore, the analysis will 
consist on the examination of 586 units of analysis.  
In addition, several cases of girls that have returned from Syria or Iraq, or that had been 
about to migrate before their family stopped them have been selected. They consist in a 
French documentary “Cycle: young people facing radical Islam” (Engrenage: Les 
jeunes face a l’Islam radical) (France 5 2015) and several newspaper articles about a 
Belgian girl who was stopped by the family and two French women that returned from 
ISIS (Burke 2015; Madame Figaro and AFP; Willsher 2016). This content will be used 
in order to confirm or reject hypothesis three/ but it will not be analyzed in depth. The 
main reason for utilizing this content is that it provides a different insight that is not 
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possible to have from the women’s social media posts because it reinforces the 
argument that female women go through a process of violent radicalization in the social 
media.    
3.2.2 Analytical Strategy 
The method termed content analysis essentially consists on the categorization of the 
phenomenon under research in order to confirm or reject the proposed hypotheses. To 
conduct the analysis, both quantitatively and qualitatively, a coding schedule and coding 
manual have been created to bring reliability and validity to the research. Each of the 
collected posts, both images and texts, conform a unit of analysis that will be coded 
according to the different variables and categories identified after conducting a beta-test 
with a small sample of posts.  
Figure 1 Coding Schedule 
Variable Question  Categories 
Name  What’s the name or nickname of 
the author of the post? 
(1) Umm Ubaydah 
(2) Aqsa Mahmood 
(3) Khadijah Dare 
(4) Sally Jones 
(5) Lena Mamoun Abdel 
Gabir 
(6) Umm Khattab 
(7) Amira Abase 
(8) Shamima Begum 
(9) Zawjatu Abou Mujahid 
(10) Zahra Halane 
(11) Salma Halane 
(12) Umm Muthanna 
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(13) Umm Irhab 
(14) Umm Usama 
(15) Muhajirah Amatullah 
(16) Umm Mu’awiyah 
(17) Umm Awar 
(18) UkhtiB 
(19) Umm Abbass 
(20) Umm Dujana 
Britaniya 
(21) Muhajira umm 
Hamza 
(22) GreenBirds22 





Theme What is the most predominant 
topic in the post? 
Identity (1) 
Discrimination (2) 




State-building in the 
“Caliphate” (7) 






Use of violence (13) 
Daily life in Syria/Iraq 
(14) 
The West (15) 
Social Media (16) 
Others (17)  










Which of these categories do 
women relate to hijrah? 
Self-identity (1) 
Discrimination (2) 
Ummah under attack (3) 
Sisterhood belonging (4) 
Religious duty (5) 
State-building (6) 
Financial Security (7) 
Marriage (8) 
Adventure (9) 
Not specified (10) 
Audience Who is the post directed to? Specific person (1) 
Muslim sisters (2) 
Muslims in general (3) 
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Non-Muslims (4) 
Not specified (5) 
Audience perception How is the receptor of the post 
considered according to the 
dichotomy ‘us versus them’? 
Enemy (1) 
Ally (2) 
Not specified (3) 
Recruitment Are women helping to recruit 
someone with the post? 
Yes (1) 
No (2) 
Tone of the 
discourse 











Not specified (3) 
Discourse (ISIS 
propaganda)  
Are certain words or discourses 




Ukhti/Akhawat/ Sister (4) 
Khilafah / Dawla/ Dar al-
Islam (5) 










Frame  Is the post related to ISIS? Yes (1) 
No (2) 





Each article is firstly coded according to the name of the person who wrote the post and 
where it was posted. All the women have adopted a kunya or nickname composed by 
umm (mother of) and an Arab name. Those women who have been identified are named 
after their birth name in this analysis and not their kunya. These two variables are not 
used to answer any of the hypotheses and only give information about who wrote the 
post and in which social media in order to be tracked easily.  
The main theme of the posts is further examined in order to identify what are the 
interests and concerns of these women. Some of the options are very similar so it is 
necessary to explain them in order to maintain the validity and reliability of the analysis. 
For example, all the posts related to attacks or the battlefield will be classified as ‘war’ 
whereas the posts about the support of violence, beheadings and other acts of violence 
that are not strictly related to the battlefield will be classified as ‘use of violence’. Other 
category to look into is ‘sisterhood’. In this category are included both posts about 
sisterhood and all the displays of affection between the women. Another category that 
needs to be specified is ‘social media’, where all the post related to the social media are 
included, such as petitions of contact through secure and encrypted applications like 
Kik. Likewise, it must be explained the difference between the category of ‘state-
building in the Caliphate’ and ‘religion’ when it comes to Sharia law. The category of 
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‘religion’ includes posts about the Islam and women’s religious aspects whereas the 
category of ‘state-building in the “Caliphate”’ include both state-building attempts and 
all that the purported Islamic State encompass, such as the implementation of the Sharia 
law.  
Finally, it must be pointed out that even though a post may not be classified as ‘ hijrah’, 
the topic can still influence in the reader’s perceptions and frames. For example, a post 
about how wonderful is the family you get in the so-called caliphate or a description of 
the life there has no direct relation to make hijrah if the woman does not call for women 
to join. However, it is spreading ISIS propaganda by portraying the territory as an ideal 
place for family, which could therefore motivate women to go. This variable helps 
answering hypotheses one and two by shedding some light to the concerns of the 
women. 
In order to better identify the reasons women had to leave Europe and join ISIS in Syria 
or Iraq, three variables have been created. First, is necessary to establish if the post is 
somehow related to the migration, hijrah. A post will be considered related to hijrah 
when women talk about their own migration or when they directly or indirectly 
encourage their audience to travel to the so-called Caliphate. It must be noticed that, 
even though the only reason a woman can narrate her life in Syria or Iraq is because she 
made hijrah, the post is not considered as related to hijrah unless the woman is calling 
for it or giving advice and information to other women to help them migrate.  
The following variable aims at identifying those posts strictly related to women’s own 
migration. After knowing their relation to migration, the reasons that influence in the 
decision of migrating to the so-called Caliphate will be coded in order to confirm or 
reject hypotheses one and two. The categories have been selected following the 
categorization in the literature review chapter and conducting the previously mentioned 
beta-test of a sample of posts. This variable has non-exclusive categories since more 
than one motive can be mentioned, especially in posts on Tumblr. However, it is true 
that sometimes women call to perform hijrah, or give advice to other women, but do not 
give any explanation of why they have to migrate. In order to avoid confusion, the 
category ‘State building’ refers not only to the opportunity to participate in the state-
building efforts in the so-called Caliphate, but also the opportunity of living in a 
territory under the Sharia Law. These two variables have to be combined with the 
 36 
previous one about themes and with the variable of ‘recruitment’, explained later on, in 
order to get a better understanding of the situation.  
The following three variables aim at answering the hypothesis number three by 
examining who is the post directed to, how is that person perceived by the women and 
if there is a clear intention to recruit with it. In the variable of the audience, the category 
‘Muslim sisters’ refers to female Muslims who may or may not be in the purported 
Caliphate, thus they can be considered allies or enemies depending on whom they are 
referring to. This category aims at identifying the frequency of posts intentionally 
directed only to women. The second variable, which focuses on the perception of the 
audience, is useful to understand the binary imaginary of ‘us versus them’ of ISIS. 
Finally, the variable about the intentions of the post explores if the women are helping 
to recruit somebody with their posts or not. It is considered that women are helping 
recruit when they give information or advice about the migration, or they actively call 
for it.  
This research also examines different aspects of the discourse. First, it focuses on the 
attitude they have in their posts towards the audience and whether or not they support 
violence. Generally, a more aggressive tone in the post will be related to a higher 
support of violence. These variables examine the degree of radicalization of the women 
and relate to the variables focused on the audience since the tone of their discourse is 
directly related to the receptor of the message.  
In addition, the specific language used in the discourse is coded in order to identify ISIS 
propaganda in the women’s posts, as well as the dichotomy of ‘us versus them’. In each 
category there is one or more words that refer to the same term. Consequently, if the 
post includes a different spelling of the word or a similar word to the one in the 
category, it will also be counted in the analysis.  
An example of this dichotomy is the comparison between the categories ‘Dar al-kufr’ 
and ‘Dar al-Islam’. The terms ‘Khilafah, Dawla or Dar al-Islam’, from the fifth 
category, are those used to refer to the purported Islamic State, whereas the category 
‘Dar al-kufr’ is used to refer to countries that are not ruled by the ‘Sharia’ (Islamic law). 
Likewise, the first category, ‘kuffar’ (disbeliever), contrasts with the second and the 
third categories, ‘mujahid (fighter)’ and ‘muhajirah (female migrant)’. ISIS has created 
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a binary classification of the people, who can only be with or against them. Similarly, 
other contrasted terms are ‘dunya’, which refers to the material world, and ‘jannah’, 
which means paradise, the hereafter. And the term ‘shaheed’, which means martyrdom, 
is compared with the category ‘kill’ to analyze how they use the term depending on who 
is the person. The rest of the categories are Arabic terms largely used by the women. 
This variable has non-exclusive categories since more than one word could be used in 
the post. This variable gives more information about the frames of ISIS and how they 
are used both to recruit and to justify the motives of their migration.  
The last two variables are correlated and aim at identifying how is ISIS portrayed in the 
social media in order to corroborate that it exists a frame alignment between the girls 
and ISIS, which is always portrayed in a positive way. In the first variable, all the posts 
that mention ISIS or make a reference to the territory under its control are considered 
related to the terrorist organization even if they do not mention ISIS in the post.  
Statistical significance and correlation of contingency tables 
In order to guarantee that the results from the analysis are statistically significant and 
that there is an interdependence between some of the variables, a Chi-squared and a 
Cramér’s V test have been conducted with the statistical software SPSS, which has been 
used for the analysis.  The combination of both tests gives the possibility to know if 
there is a relationship between the different variables compared in the contingency 
tables, or crosstabs, and thereby that results can be generalizable to the population from 
which the sample has been taken (Bryman 2012, p. 347-348). The maximum level of 
statistical significance that is acceptable in this analysis is p 0.05, in other words, that 
there are less than 5 chances in 100 that the relationship between the two variables has 
happened by chance. In addition, the Cramér’s V test helps identify how strong is the 
relation between the two variables (Ibid. p. 344). However, this research will not make 
emphasis on the strength of the relation between variables since in the hypotheses do 
not primarily aim at showing relationships between variables.   
The results from the tests are posted beneath the contingency tables in appendix A. 
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3.2.3 Reliability and validity 
The reliability of a social research consists in whether the measurement in the study is 
consistent over time, thus producing the same results if the research was done by other 
researchers or in a different period of time (Bryman 2012, p. 169). In order to guarantee 
the reliability of this research, the author has conducted a pilot test or beta-test of the 
coding scheme in order to amend possible difficulties or inconsistencies in the coding 
schedule (Ibid. p. 304).  
Validity, on the other hand, refers to the integrity of the results, whether the indicator 
used to measure a concept really measures that concept (Ibid. p. 171). The internal 
validity, which refers to the causal relation between variables, is secured by the 
correlation between the independent variable, making hijrah, and the dependent 
variables used on the analysis (Ibid. p. 47). The results from the Chi-squared test and 
the Cramér’s V test show a correlation between some of the variables. The external 
validity of this research is applicable to other European women who have presence on 
the social media; however, is difficult to guarantee it to other samples because it is an 
under-researched field.    
3.3 Limitations  
This research is grounded in the under-researched field of western female migration to 
join a terrorism organization. Until recently, the study of western participation in 
terrorism has focused on male foreign fighters, who have joined violent groups in 
conflicts around the world. However, after the rise of ISIS, Europe has witnessed the 
unprecedented phenomenon of European women leaving their home countries to join 
this terrorist organization in Iraq and Syria. Therefore, this research departs from an 
under-researched topic and similar studies are limited.  
One of the limitations that this research has faced when conducting this research is the 
impossibility to directly contact these women, who refuse to talk with journalists or 
researchers. Therefore, the only way of understanding why they have left their home 
countries to join ISIS is by analyzing their social media posts. The researcher is aware 
of the fact that people may not express all their thoughts in their social media profiles. 
In addition, not all women who have travelled to Syria are active in the social media; 
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therefore the results obtained in previous analyses could be different if the sample 
included the women without social media profiles. Nevertheless, that option is not 
possible since there is not direct communication with the researchers at the moment.  
Luckily, those European women who travelled to Syria and have social media profiles 
were very active and explicit when talking about their experiences and thoughts.   
Another obstacle is that since 2015 thousands of ISIS supporters’ accounts have been 
blocked or deleted, eliminating all the material used by previous researchers. Therefore, 
the amount of posts from these women that still remain on the web is limited. In order 
to mitigate this problem, the researcher contacted the Institute for Strategic Dialogue to 
request access to a database of the women’s posts but she did not receive any answer. 
Consequently, this study has conducted a search of these posts in a different way, as it 
has been explained in the section of data collection, cf. chapter 3.2.1. It is acknowledged 
that only some posts, the most relevant ones from a journalistic point of view, will be 
recovered, and this could damage the validity of the research. However, with a 
systematic and rule-bounded analysis of the recovered material, the validity of the study 
is guaranteed. In addition, this study aims to include other women that do not appear in 





In this section the results obtained from the analysis are presented with the help of 
tables. The will be later examined and interpreted in the discussion chapter in order to 
corroborate or reject the hypotheses introduced in the methodology chapter.   
 The analysis was composed of 586 posts from Twitter, Tumblr and Ask.fm, which 
belonged to twenty-two different women. A video and several articles about three 
French-speaking teenagers who returned from Syria or were stopped by their family 
have also been taken into consideration. This content will be included in the following 
chapter to support the results presented below.  
All the frequency tables and contingency tables from this analysis can be found in the 
appendix A.  
The results from the analysis show that half of the posts belong to only two of the 
twenty-two women, precisely to Aqsa Mahmood, a Scottish 21-years-old woman who is 
known for recruiting other women; and an unknown woman that uses the name of Umm 
Ubaydah in the social media and is believed to be European. They were two of the most 
known Europeans in Syria because they were very active on Twitter and Tumblr. 
Therefore, it has been easier to find past posts from them than others in archive webs. 
As it has already been mentioned, all accounts of this study were suspended before the 
beginning of this study. 
All the women in this research mainly used Twitter as the propaganda tool par 
excellence, and some of them also used Tumblr to talk about their migration experience 
and to give information and advice to other girls. However, all the conversations with 
other women who aimed at migrating to Syria were through encrypted message 





Table 1. Theme 
Theme F % 
 
Identity 13 2.2 
Discrimination 8 1.4 
Ummah under attack 13 2.2 
Sisterhood 36 6.1 
Religion 49 8.4 
Hijrah 89 15.2 
State-building in the 
Caliphate 
30 5.1 
Financial security 7 1.2 
Marriage and family 33 5.6 
Adventure 2 .3 
War 62 10.6 
Martyrdom 47 8.0 
Use of violence 27 4.6 
Daily life in 
Syria /Iraq 
60 10.2 
The West 44 7.5 
Social media 47 8.0 
Others 19 3.2 
Total 586 100.0 
All the data collected shows that these women have other interests apart from trying to 
lure others to join ISIS. In addition to talking about hijrah in 15% of the articles, the 
main topics were the war and their daily lives in Syria, in other words what affected 
them day-to-day. Although the interests of these women vary, religion and martyrdom 
were also an important part of their lives, which were present in around 8% of the 
articles. Some of these topics were further analyzed in cf. table 4 where the motives or 
benefits from migrating to Syria were identified.  
Table 2. Migration Related 
Migration Related F % 
 
Yes 129 22.2 
No 457 77.8 
Total 586 100.0 
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As previously mentioned, this research analyzed all the posts found, not just those 
related to hijrah, in order to have a comprehensive understanding of these women. 
Therefore, as table 2 shows, only 22% of the posts were related to the migration. The 
difference between Table 1, where hijrah as a topic was only present in 15% of the 
articles, is due to the existence of other posts where the main theme is not the migration. 
For example, some posts about the convenience of arranging a marriage upon arrival 
were classified as part of the marriage and family category but they were also related to 
migration.  
Table 3. Own Experience of Migration 
Own Experience F % 
 
Yes 37 30.8 
No 83 69.2 
Total 129 100.0 
 
The analysis also shows that most of the posts that are related to migration are not 
focused on explaining the migration of the women who are writing them, which means 
that, instead, most of the posts either encourage women to make hijrah or provide them 
with information.  
Table 4. Migration Reasons – Multiple Responses 
Migration Reasons 
Responses Percent of 
Cases N Percent 
Migration reasons a Self-Identity 1 1.1% 1.6% 
Discrimination 6 6.9% 9.7% 
Ummah under attack 4 4.6% 6.5% 
Sisterhood belonging 7 8.0% 11.3% 
Religious Duty 33 37.9% 53.2% 
State-Building 20 23.0% 32.3% 
Financial Security 8 9.2% 12.9% 
Marriage 7 8.0% 11.3% 
Adventure 1 1.1% 1.6% 
Total 87 100.0% 140.3% 
a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1 = yes. 
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Table 4 shows the motives that women have considered in order to migrate to Syria or 
Iraq to join ISIS. From the data reflected in this table and the qualitative observations of 
all the posts, it can be stated that the main reason they identified as a motive to migrate 
was their religious duty. The categories of religious duty and State-building, which 
includes the opportunity to live under the Sharia law and the state building 
opportunities, represented a 51 % of the total. The rest of the reasons mentioned by the 
women were not considered as motives by them, but as benefits or grievances that 
contributed to their decision to migrate, since they consider migration as a religious 
obligation. This will be further discussed in the next chapter with extracts from the 
posts and in relation with the theoretical framework of this research.  







Yes Count 89 40 129 
% within Migration related 69.0% 31.0% 100.0% 
No Count 19 438 457 
% within Migration related 4.2% 95.8% 100.0% 
Total Count 108 478 586 
% within Migration related 18.4% 81.6% 100.0% 
 
Table 5 displays the correlation between the migration and recruitment and shows that 
only an 18% of the overall posts have the intention to recruit others. It is remarkable 
that not all the posts aimed at recruiting were related to migration, only a 70%, which 
can be explained by cases were women were intentionally recruiting others to support 
their ideology but did not mentioned hijrah.  
The small number of recruitment posts needs to be understood within the context of the 
analysis. The results from recruitment refer only to those posts where the women 
explicitly were calling for migration and support or insinuating it in the text. Discerning 
whether a post aimed at recruiting can be subjective since some of the texts or images 
seem to not have an alluring effect but they do for radicalized women. Therefore, 
photos of sunsets in Syria or texts about martyrdom, for example, were not considered 
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to being recruiting unless it was clearly explicit, even though someone could have, as a 
matter of fact, lured some women into migrating to Syria and Iraq.  
Table 6. Audience 
Audience F % 
 
Specific person 95 16.2 
Muslim sisters 46 7.8 
Muslims in general 66 11.3 
Non-Muslims 18 3.1 
Not specified 361 61.6 
Total 586 100.0 
After knowing the recruiting intentions that these women may have, it is necessary to 
understand who the audience of the posts is in order to better comprehend how social 
media recruitment works. Despite the majority of posts (62%) were not directed to 
anyone in particular, it is remarkable that 16% of the posts were directed to a specific 
person, the vast majority of which were answers to anonymous requests about migration 
on Tumblr. This indicates that there are two main channels for radicalization that 
function concurrently in the radicalization process: the consumption of post form 
women in Syria, and the interaction with them.  




Aggressive Neutral Affective 
Audience 
Perception 
Enemy Count 18 13 1 32 
% within Aud. 
Perception 
56.3% 40.6% 3.1% 100.0% 
Ally Count 4 78 55 137 
% within Aud. 
Perception 
2.9% 56.9% 40.1% 100.0% 
Not 
Specified 
Count 37 281 99 417 
% within Aud. 
Perception 
8.9% 67.4% 23.7% 100.0% 
Total Count 59 372 155 586 
% within Aud. 
perception 
10.1% 63.5% 26.5% 100.0% 
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As explained before, analyzing the audience has contributed to better understand these 
women and Table 7 shows how the audience perception is related to the tone they use in 
the texts. As in Table 6, the perception of the audience was mainly not specified since 
there were not indicators of being allies or enemies and the same happened with the 
discourse tone of the posts, which were mainly neutral. However, the overall data shows 
that the posts had a neutral or affective tone and that the audience perceived as an 
enemy was limited, which indicates that they probably avoided interacting with those 
considered enemies, as well as, using hateful speech in general. This statement will be 
further discussed in the following chapter because of its implications in violent 
radicalization and recruitment.  
Table 8. Contingency Table of Relation to Violence and Discourse Tone 
 
Discourse tone 
Total Aggressive Neutral Affective 
Relation to 
violence 
Support Count 45 53 14 112 
% within Rel. to 
Violence 
40.2% 47.3% 12.5% 100.0% 
Against Count 0 1 3 4 
% within Rel. to 
Violence 
0.0% 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
Not 
specified 




3.0% 67.7% 29.4% 100.0% 




10.1% 63.5% 26.5% 100.0% 
 
The results in Table 8, obtained from the interrelation of the relation to violence and the 
discourse tone, display that as in previous cases the majority of the posts were not 
related to violence. However, those that did were overall supporting it, except for four 
posts. What stands out from the results is that not all the posts that supported violence 
were aggressive, as it could have been expected. 47% of the posts that supported 
violence had a neutral tone, which indicates the normalization of violence. In addition, 
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13% of them were classified as affective, which implies that violence was considered as 
something good. This will also be further analyzed in the following chapter.  
Table 9. ISIS relation 
ISIS relation F % 
 
Yes 207 35.3 
No 379 64.7 
Total 586 100.0 
 
The results obtained from the analysis, display a surprising data, which is that only 35% 
of the posts are related to ISIS. This is surprising taking into account that these women 
live in the so-called Islamic State and they support its ideology as is shown in the next 
table. The fact that only one out of three posts refer to ISIS can be understood as a 
propaganda strategy as it will be explained in the discussion chapter.  
Table 10. ISIS portrayal 
ISIS portrayal F % 
 
Positive 193 93.2 
Neutral 11 5.3 
Negative 3 1.4 
Total 207 100.0 
 
As it was expected, those posts that referred to ISIS were overall considered as positive 
except for three cases where two women complained about the treatment in the so-






Table 11. Discourse - Multiple responses 
Discourse 
Responses Percent of 
Cases N Percent 
Discoursea Kuffar /Kaffir 39 8.5% 13.7% 
Mujahid 33 7.2% 11.6% 
Muhajirah 14 3.1% 4.9% 
Ukthi/Akhawat/Sister
(s) 
68 14.8% 23.9% 
Khilafah/Dawla/Dar 
al-Islam 
98 21.4% 34.4% 
Dar al-kufr 14 3.1% 4.9% 
Shaheed/Martyr 49 10.7% 17.2% 
Kill 22 4.8% 7.7% 
Dunya 9 2.0% 3.2% 
Jannah 21 4.6% 7.4% 
Hijrah 40 8.7% 14.0% 
Jihad 24 5.2% 8.4% 
Sharia 20 4.4% 7.0% 
Ummah 7 1.5% 2.5% 
Total 458 100.0% 160.7% 
a. Dichotomy group tabulated at value 1. 
Finally, the last table displays a list of concepts and terms used, amongst others, by ISIS 
and that were reflected in the women’s posts. Some of these words aimed at analyzing 
ISIS dichotomy of ‘us versus them’. The results show that 20% of the articles included 
words such as Dawla or Khilafah to refer to the territory under ISIS control, being this 
category the most used in all the posts. The word Syria was not taken into account, 
which reflects how rooted is this concept in these women’s discourse. It is also 
remarkable that the concept of martyrdom was mentioned the double than the concept 
of killing, which indicates a dichotomy between ‘our dead’ who are considered martyrs 
and ‘their dead’ which are considered as killed. This dichotomy will be further 
explained in the following chapter. 
In conclusion, the results of the analysis show that these women talked about different 
things in their social media, especially the migration and the life in Syria or Iraq, which 
also includes the war they are suffering. Moreover, almost one out of four posts was 
related to migration, although the vast majority of women did not mention their 
experiences, on the contrary, they focused on giving advice and calling for joining, 
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which can be considered as a recruitment attempt. The main reason they gave to join 
ISIS was the religious obligation that according to them has been imposed by Allah. In 
addition, they highlighted discrimination as the main grievance in the West and the 
state-building opportunities and the financial security offered by the so-called Islamic 
State.  
As mentioned above, only 1 out of 5 posts had the intention to actively recruit others. 
On the other hand, there is evidence that women had contact with specific people, most 
of which was about hijrah and to continuing the conversation on more secure platforms. 
Without taking into account those unspecified, the majority of the audience was 
considered an ally and the overall discourse was neutral or affective. Moreover, ISIS 
was mentioned in one out three posts and its portrayal was considered almost 
completely positive. Furthermore, ISIS discourse and dichotomy of “us vs. them” is 
evident in the use of concepts such as kuffar or referring to Syria as Dawla.   
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5 Discussion 
This research aimed at shedding some light into the paradox of why Western female 
Muslims had decided to migrate to Syria or Iraq to join the terrorist organization ISIS. 
This new phenomenon has been under-researched until recently because there have not 
been previous cases of western female migration to join a terrorist group in such a high 
number. This study attempts to contribute to the existing knowledge with a more 
theoretical and comprehensive approach. As previously stated in this paper, the analysis 
has aimed at answering the following research question: “Why European women decide 
to leave their home countries and move to Syria and Iraq to join ISIS?” 
This question has been operationalized to produce three hypotheses that have been 
examined by conducting a content analysis. The results were displayed in the previous 
chapter and here they will be interpreted in relation to the theory of the research and the 
literature review in order to give the reader a deeper understanding of this phenomenon 
and answer the question posited on the research. It must be noted that the results from 
the analysis consist on the interpretation of 22 females who have migrated to ISIS. 
Therefore, when answering the hypotheses mentioned below, it is necessary to 
understand that the way they interpret reality may not be the same as the way scholars 
do.  
Hypothesis 1: European female Muslims make hijrah because they have perceived 
grievances against Europe 
As previously mentioned in the literature review chapter, there is evidence that female 
Muslims are the main targets of Islamophobic violence, which has increased in the past 
years and it’s based on the assumption that there is a lack of compatibility between 
some interpretations of Islam and European values (Seta 2016, p. 3; Collectif Contre 
l’Islamophobie en France 2016). Oliver Roy and other French scholars identify 
discrimination as a factor in the process of violent radicalization because, as they 
explain, European Muslims have been raised in Western values and no longer relate to 
their parents’ cultural, national and Islamic traditions (Roy 2007, p. 52-53; 
Khosrokhavar 2008; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010, p. 800). Therefore, suffering 
discrimination based on religion, ethnicity and gender can have an impact in the way 
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they identify themselves, and create a feeling of non-belonging and alienation that Akil 
Awan labels ‘dual cultural alterity’ (Awan 2015, p. 62). 
Western values of relativism and individualism have made the search for identity, 
community belonging and a meaningful life a common trend among individuals in 
society (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010, p. 799). Consequently, ISIS has taken advantage of 
this situation and has created an alternative narrative to lure these women by exploiting 
their perceived grievances, known as push factors, and offering them an alternative way 
of life or pull factors. These women have experienced a process of identity search where 
they have aligned their values, beliefs and interests with ISIS coherent and convincing 
frames (Borum 2011; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010, 2008).  
Using a research from the Institute for Strategic Dialogue this paper has identified self-
identity, discrimination and the prosecution of the Muslim community as push factors 
(Saltman and Smith 2015).  
The overall results of the analysis show that women do not talk only about migration on 
their social media. Despite that, hijrah is the topic most mentioned (15%) along with the 
war and how their daily lives are in the territory. Therefore, the results that are needed 
to confirm or reject the hypothesis one will contain small percentages.  
That is reflected in the results about the themes of the posts, where these women rarely 
talk about discrimination, identity problems or the persecution of the Muslim 
community in Europe. This does not mean that these perceived problems do not exist in 
society or that they are not concerned about them. It must be understood that an analysis 
of the social media is the best way to know how these women think when it is not 
possible to conduct personal interviews with them. However, this approach has 
limitations that have been overcome by having a strong theoretical framework and 
adopting a comprehensive approach towards the phenomenon. The study has included 
the stories of some women who returned from Syria or were stopped before being able 
to flee in order to avoid limiting the analysis.  
Identity and identity formation is a common process among individuals and it can be 
redefined, sometimes in a drastic way. These women have experience a search for 
identity and have ended up identifying themselves with an extremist interpretation of 
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Islam and rejecting the Western values of the countries they were raised in. Even though 
they do not mention to be searching for their identity, probably because they do not use 
the social media to expose all their thoughts and fears, it is possible to see these changes 
in some of the profiles.  
For example, the Twitter of Amira Abase, one of the group of three girls that left the 
United Kingdom to join ISIS, shows that before becoming radicalized she used to go 
shopping, was interested in football matches and she even asked about whether getting a 
piercing was Haram (forbidden) (Saltman and Smith 2015). This happened three 
months before leaving for Syria, which shows that she went through a fast radicalization 
process that will be further explained when trying to confirm hypothesis three. Another 
example is Aqsa Mahmood, who expressed being confused and having feelings of not 
belonging in her Tumblr account (Internet Archive 2015b). These examples show that, 
in spite of not mentioning it on the social media, there is some evidence that they 
experience a process of non-belonging and search for a new identity.  
The following cases, even though they are not statistically significant, are used as 
examples to support the results from the analysis and to show a different side of this 
phenomenon that is not possible to perceive by analyzing the social media. In the first 
case, a French woman, using the pseudonym of Sophie Kasiki, relates how she 
converted to Islam to fill the gap left by the death of her mother and the recruiters, a 
group of young men she knew, took advantage of her naivety, weakness and insecurity 
to recruit her (Willsher 2016). In the second case, which is a fragment of a 
documentary, a French girl using the pseudonym of Cathy explains that she became 
radicalized because she had a feeling of hate towards what surrounded her and what was 
happening in the world (France 5 2015). These examples support the assumption that 
these women go through a process of identity search and non-belonging.  
Discrimination is also a theme that does not interest them in particular, however, when 
talking about what influences their migration, discrimination is the most mentioned 
among the three, as shown in Table 4. Discrimination is a broad term, yet it is 
remarkable that in the few posts where they mention discrimination, they do not refer to 
physical or verbal discrimination, but to the oppression they perceive to be suffering in 
the West because of the impossibility to practice Islam. It is not possible to prove that 
these women suffered any type of discrimination before becoming radicalized. 
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Regardless, they do suffer it once they go to Syria or are known as ISIS supporters on 
the social media, as Umm Ubaydah tweets, “Wht I get the weirdest abuse in my 
mentions. Lol idc [I don’t care]…After Hardship surely comes ease.” (Archive.is 2014). 
They become the target of hate speech and discrimination, which only creates a stronger 
revulsion towards the West and reduces the possibility to change their minds.  
Finally, the repression of the Muslim community, known as Ummah, around the world 
is the last factor identified in this hypothesis. As in the previous cases, the results of the 
analysis show that women do not have an interest in this factor and is barely mentioned 
as a reason to join ISIS. However, there is an interest about the war in Syria, not only 
because they are living there, but also because they consider themselves to be helping 
the real Muslims. A woman using the kunya Muhajirah Amatullah complains that 
“Scholars condemn the killing of Kuffar “children” in Pakistan, Whilst [sic] not a word 
of the genocide against ACTUAL Muslim children [is said]” (Smith 2015). Moreover, 
most of the posts about the West, which represent a 7.5% (see Table 1), criticize the 
participation of Western countries in the Syrian war or attack and threaten them. This is 
an indicator of the revulsion they have towards the countries where they were born.  
Taking everything into account, it is evident that European female Muslims who have 
joined ISIS have gone through a radicalization process where they have created a new 
identity around a conservative interpretation of Islam, no matter if they were Muslims 
before or not, and that has led them to eventually embrace ISIS frames, which is based 
on the tenets of the jihadist Salafism doctrine. This support of violence is reflected in 
the results of the analysis, as shown in chapter 4. This new identity search has been 
cause for different reasons and it is impossible to determine a salient motive taking into 
account that there is not just one profile of female migrant. Islamophobic discrimination 
is Europe is evident and has had an effect on this new phenomenon, but it cannot be 
blamed for it since only a small minority of the Muslim female population has moved to 
Syria and there is no evidence that the women who have migrated suffered 
discrimination in Europe.  
Therefore, the hypothesis one can be validated since Muslim female migrants are aware 
of these grievances. Even though, they do not consider them as the major reason to 
leave, since most of their posts focus on the pull factors, these women believe that they 
must leave because they cannot be practice Islam in the West. Therefore, by exalting the 
 53 
benefits of the so-called Islamic State, as it will be analyzed in the next section, they 
indirectly show that they have grievances towards Europe.  
Hypothesis 2: European female Muslims make hijrah because they believe it is a 
religious duty and ISIS offers them community belonging, security and a purpose 
in life 
Hypothesis two is directly related to the first one because both of them analyze the 
motives these women have to make hijrah. Consequently, this hypothesis is also 
anchored on the framing theory and the theories of identity explained in the literature 
review chapter.  
Alienation and feelings of non-belonging lead women to search for an identity and ISIS 
has taken advantage of it by offering them what they yearn the most, a community 
(Awan 2015, p. 63; Saltman and Smith 2015). The terrorist organization offers them a 
comprehensive and complete interpretation of reality where problems are considered 
injustices that are produced by a specific group of people, who are considered 
accountable. In addition, ISIS constructs an argument to morally justify violence in 
order to do what is believed to be right (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2008, p. 7). Dichotomous 
discourse is widely embraced worldwide because the interpretation of the world in a 
binary way is easier to comprehend that a system where different values and beliefs 
coexist and where everything is relative.  
This paper identifies five motives, or pull factors, that lured women into migrating to 
the so-called Islamic State based on the research by Saltman and Smith (2015) and a 
paper by Barbara Walter (2015). In order to obtain a better operationalization, the 
religion and state building factor was separated in two in the analysis.  
The results show that the religious duty and State-building combined represent 51% of 
the motives of migration given by the women (see Table 4). As previously mentioned 
these women have clearly stated that the only reason to migrate to the so-called 
Caliphate is because is compulsory. Umm Irhab twitted, “I have never personally met a 
sister i [sic] Sham who came here because of a “romantic thought abt [sic] war or bcos 
[sic] of a man” We all come bcos[sic] Allah” (Hall 2015b). These women happily 
encourage others and even pressure them using religion. For example, by claiming that 
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Muslims can only live under the Sharia law and that the only way to enter into jannah 
(paradise) is by making hijrah to the Islamic State (Internet Archive 2015b). 
Nadia (pseudonym), a young girl from France who managed to leave ISIS, corroborates 
that religion was her main motive. She told the media that the recruiter convinced her 
arguing that she was living in a country without Islam and she would go to hell. After 
radicalizing and becoming isolated from everybody, hijrah seemed as the best option so 
she fled to Syria with the money facilitated by ISIS (Madame Figaro and AFP 2015).  
State-building intentions and migration are therefore considered compulsory as Umm 
Ubaydah explains, “Trying to build an ‘Islamic state’ is a Must [fardh ayn] upon all 
Muslims” (Internet Archive 2015a). Along these lines, Aqsa Mahmood explains, 
“Every Muslim women deserves [sic] to live under the law of Sharia, to have her 
honour [sic] preserved and her rights given. It’s beautiful wallahi [by Allah]” (Archive 
2014). Therefore, it is evident that by appealing to religion and regarding hijrah as 
compulsory ISIS has created a binary thinking that pushes women, who have 
internalized the organization’s frames, to migrate to the so-called Islamic State. It is all 
reduced to the dichotomy of making hijrah or not being a good Muslim.  
For them, being a good Muslim in the Islamic State means to become a “righteous wife 
and to raise righteous children” (Umm Ubaydah in Hoyle et al. 2015, p.22). Therefore, 
having a job is largely impossible and all of them have assumed and embrace their role 
as housewives.  
Financial security is surprisingly considered by these women as another motive, or at 
least as a benefit, of living in the so-called Islamic State. In their posts, they praise how 
many things they receive for free, such as a houses, appliances and amenities. Zahra 
Halane, one of the twin sisters that left Britain, twitted, “Food free….House 
free….Ya3ni [like] we established the sharia…Allah has blessed Islamic State. Don't 
delay this blessing and Make hijra!!!” (Hall 2015b). European Muslim females living in 
Syria and Iraq continuously tweet about how wonderful their lives are in the so-called 
Islamic State and use Western decoys to lure younger girls, especially food, as in this 
tweet from Aqsa Mahmood (Archive.is 2014): 
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(Source: Archive.is 2014) 
In addition to the financial security, women also identify sisterhood belonging as a 
benefit of making hijrah. Other muhajirat (female migrants) become family for them, 
especially because their husbands are fighting in the battlefield during weeks and these 
women spend most of their time together. Muhajirah Amatullah tweets, “When ur 
called “ukhti” (my sister) Its just beautiful. U feel like u belong to a family, U feel 
protected + safe. Alhamdulillah [praise God] for #IS” (Pooley 2015, p. 72). These 
friendships may have even started before arriving in Syria since some of these women 
use their social media to recruit others, as it will be analyzed in Hypothesis three.  
The factor of marriage is also mentioned in the posts, but not as a reason to migrate to 
Syria. Indeed, many of the posts focus on the necessity of getting married in Syria to be 
able to move around, since unmarried women live in makars (hostels), which cannot 
leave without a male companion. Umm Ubaydah tweets that “…being single in sham 
[Syria] is extremely difficult…” and adds that “Sisters who are thinking of coming here 
and not marrying, by Allah I’ve never known of a single sister unless she was going to 
marry soon” (Hall 2015a). Aqsa Mahmood also states that, “I have stressed this before 
on Twitter but I really need sisters to stop dreaming about coming to Shaam [Syria] and 
not getting married” (Internet Archive 2015b). However, that does not mean they do not 
love their husbands. From the observations of the posts it can be stated that these 
women praise marriage and express their love and devotion towards their husbands, but 
the majority of them did not come to Syria because they had fallen in love with an ISIS 
fighter.  
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Finally, the adventure factor was only mentioned in one post where Muhajirah 
Amatullah calls for people to join “the State which shook the world off its feet!” 
(Pooley 2015, p. 64). Despite photos of women practicing shooting, like the following 
pictures from Zahra Halane (Hall 2015a), there is no evidence that women are allowed 
in the fight.  
Figure 3. Zahra Halane tweet 
(Source: Hall 2015a) 
Since this type of photos may lead to unrealistic expectations, Aqsa Mahmood clearly 
explains in Tumblr that there is not jihad for women, “I will be straight up and blunt 
with you all, there is absolutely nothing for sisters to participate in Qitaal [fighting]” 
(Internet Archive 2015b). Therefore, adventure is not considered to be a pull factor in 
this case.  
In conclusion, using religion and the state-building opportunities as the main reason to 
migrate to the so-called Caliphate is a smart strategy because these women see it as a 
good deed for Allah and they believe to be part of something bigger than them. In 
reality, they are joining a terrorist group that exploits and manipulates the religion of 
Islam to justify its acts and lures Muslims into joining their war against the West. In 
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addition, ISIS propaganda about the life in Syria can be tempting when it is portrayed as 
having fun with your friends, getting monthly stipends, eating Western food and having 
a lovely husband that will sadly attain martyrdom soon and intercede for you before 
Allah. However, the reality is grimmer but that is not reported in the social media. One 
of French women, Nadia, explains that the jihadists fantasized more about the “kalach” 
[Kalashnikov] that about the Quran (Madame Figaro and AFP 2015). She explains that 
she got married to get out of the women’s hostel, but got divorced the following day 
and a few days later was arrested by ISIS under suspicions of being a collaborator of the 
French police. She recalls the pressures and death threats received during her time in 
Syria (Ibid.).  
Therefore, the results from the analysis confirm Hypothesis two since the women 
clearly state that making hijrah is a divine commandment as well as the construction of 
an Islamic State. In addition, the benefits that these women reflect on their social media 
can have an allure for other women that is not perceived by those who do not support 
ISIS. Certainly, the depiction of the purported Islamic State in the social media is far 
from reality but is hard to convince them because ISIS strictly controls the 
communications in the area.  
Hypothesis 3: Group radicalization in the social media fosters European women’s 
migration to the so-called Caliphate.  
According to the Social Movement Theories, violent radicalization in groups or peer-to-
peer can ease the adoption of extremist frames (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010). Thus, social 
media have become the perfect platform to spread propaganda and recruit people since 
it makes contact easier and it has broken many communication barriers.  
The theory of the six degrees of separation, which argues that everybody is separated 
from the rest of the world in a maximum of six people, in other words, that if someone 
wants to get in contact with the President of the United States, he has to contact the 
right person who will give the contact of someone else and so on until a maximum of 
six people. However, this has shrunk to an average of three and a half people, according 
to a study from Cornell, the Università degli Studi di Milano and Facebook (Edunov et 
al. 2016).  
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In the case of ISIS’ recruiting, this number can be reduced to only one person since 
some women are openly available in the social media to help others make hijrah. The 
results from this research show that 69% of the posts related to migration were actively 
aiming at recruiting (see Table 5). In addition, 16% of the audience is a specific person, 
many of which are anonymous messages on Tumblr asking for advice about hijrah (see 
Table 6). And others give information about encrypted platforms where these women 
can be contacted privately.  
Umm Ubaydah tweets “… if I can help you in any way pls kik me inshaAllah [if God 
wills]. My kik is:_axa” (James and Hall 2015). But she’s not the only one, Umm 
Mu’awiyah, also known as Umm Usamah, also tweeted “…Sisters who need any help 
regarding hijrah can message me on Kik – UmmUsamahh” (Hall 2015b). These posts 
illustrate how radicalization is, indeed, a social process even if it happens online. The 
case of Laurie (pseudonym) shows that she believed that going to the so-called 
Caliphate was a mission of Allah and that she would find paradise there. She explains 
that she was talking with an average of 50 people (France 5 2015). Even though the 
previous example is not statistically significant, it has been selected to support this 
analysis by offering the point of view and experiences of those who are going through a 
process of de-radicalization after being prevented to go to Syria by their family. This 
case also confirms the assumption that radicalization is mainly a social process even if it 
happens in the strictest secrecy. 
Some of these women are dedicated recruiters responsible for giving information to 
their audiences about their own migration and offering useful advice. There is evidence 
that Aqsa Mahmood may have helped with the logistics of the migration of three 
schoolgirls from Britain who left together at the end of February 2015. Just some days 
before one of the girls, Shamima Begum, tweeted Aqsa Mahmood saying 
“@Muhajirah_ follow me so i can dm [direct message] you back” (James and Hall 
2015). This evidence proves the existence of a recruiting strategy inside ISIS. This post 
from Aqsa Mahmood confirms her duty as a recruiter “Wallahi [by God] I had no 
intention of coming back to any social networks but it has become Fardh [mandatory] 
upon I to share the Haqq [truth] on sisters coming to Shaam [Syria]” (Archive.is 2014).  
As previously explained in the literature review chapter, Wiktorowicz has identified a 
four-staged model of violent radicalization where the individual goes through a process 
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of cognitive opening, adopts religion as a source of meaning and aligns its ideas and 
beliefs with the social movement to finally join them actively (Borum 2011, p. 18-19; 
Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010, 2008).  
It has been difficult to observe this process in the analysis since the majority of posts 
were published once the girls were in the so-called Islamic State and therefore were in 
the last stage of this model. Nevertheless, some posts have been found to support this 
theory. Aqsa Mahmood mentions in a Tumblr post “The more and more I read up on the 
Islamic veil the more I realize how the niqab is actually fardh [obligatory]” (Bradford 
2015). This indicates a change in values and the adoption of a more conservative 
interpretation of Islam, which is what ISIS promotes.  
The frame alignment consists in the adoption of the same values and beliefs, but also in 
the embracement of ISIS binary thinking and dichotomous discourse. Women refer to 
the enemy as kuffar, disbeliever, which is a term that has not been used in other 
conflicts, whereas those considered allies are referred to as mujahid [male fighters] or 
muhajirah [female migrant]. In addition, they contrast the term Dar-al Islam [land of 
Islam] with Dar-al Kufr [land of disbelievers], as Sally Jones does in this tweet: 
“Exactly a year ago today I left dar-al-kufr [land of disbelievers] and made hijrah to 
dar-al-Islam [land of Islam]..Allhamdulilah [praise be to God]” (McCarty 2015).  
Finally, those who die in the so-called Islamic State are always considered as shaheed 
[martyr] whereas enemies are just killed. The concept of martyrdom is a keystone in 
ISIS propaganda because it implies that the person has suffered persecution and has 
died defending Islam, reinforcing the discourse that the West is waging a war against 
Muslims. This dichotomous discourse comes down to what Umm Irhab tweets, “My 
advise to Muslims all over the world, make hijrah before its too late. This is a war 
against Islam, so you are either with us or against us” (Pooley 2015, p. 59).  
All the women in this analysis find themselves in the fourth stage of Wiktorowicz 
model (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2008) and they support ISIS’ ideology in a 93% of the cases 
(see Table 10). They have completely aligned their frames with ISIS up to the point of 
embracing violence against others as something good. The results of the analysis show 
that 47% (see Table 8) of the times when violence is mentioned, these women have a 
neutral tone, which indicates the normalization of violence in their lives.  
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Moreover, another 12% of the cases had an affective tone either because they were 
related to martyrdom, which is considered a blessing, or because they were cheerful 
about somebody’s dead, dehumanizing the enemy as a way to be able to support 
violence. Umm Ubaydah celebrates the ISIS violence saying: “So many beheadings at 
the same time, Allahu Akbar [God is the greatest], this video is beautiful 
#DawlaMediaTeamDoingItRight” (Hoyle et al. 2015, p. 29).  
Furthermore, women’s recruitment strategy is characterized by ignoring those verbally 
abusing them on the social media and using a neutral or even affective language in order 
to portray themselves as kind-hearted Muslims, which surprisingly contrast with some 
posts waging jihad. This attitude helps creating stronger bonds with prospective recruits 
and depicting these women as victims of the West, which is what they attempt to 
increase their recruits. Naturally, not all behave in the same way and some are more 
aggressive than others in their speech.  
All these features from the radicalization process can be observed in the story of Maysa 
(pseudonym), a Belgian 18-year-old girl who was about to flee her country to join the 
Islamic State (Burke 2015). She told the media how one day, after posting a photo 
wearing a jilbab (long, loose-fit garment) to hide some weight, she was contacted by 
another girl who quickly introduces her to a group of friends. They first talked about 
clothes and Islam, but the conversations turned more politicized and at some point the 
only theme was ISIS and the life in the so-called Caliphate, which was portrayed in a 
positive way. There was little discussion of other issues that were not ISIS. They gave 
her a prepaid phone to be able to contact each other secretly. Within months Maysa 
changed and was seeing her new friends more frequently and the pressure to go to Syria 
grew. She explains, “I just got to the point where going [to Syria] was all I wanted to 
do. I believed what I heard” (Ibid.). When the time came, she tried to get her passport, 
but her parents had hidden it for fear, she asked her friends for some time but they 
responded with threats if she didn’t manage to leave. She decided to destroy her prepaid 
phone and over time realized what had happened, “I was totally radicalized. I was not 
thinking my thoughts. I was not who I am” (Ibid.).  
This story, although not statistically significant, is an example of what has been 
extracted from the results of the analysis. Social media is a cornerstone of violent 
radicalization and recruitment nowadays. Therefore, hypothesis three can be validated 
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because the results from the analysis prove that social media enables to get in contact 
easily with ISIS recruiters and vice versa, and it also hastens the radicalization process 
since people are constantly online. In some cases, the radicalization of these women has 
happened within a couple of months. In addition, as the results indicate, women actively 
work as recruiters and try to allure as many women as possible.  
It must be noted that social media only show the surface of this problem and that the 
real radicalization happens in secrecy both offline and online in encrypted applications 
such as Kik. Therefore, in order to overcome this limitation, this research has included 
the reports of several girls, which have concurred with the results obtained in the 
analysis.  
In conclusion, the results from the analysis have confirmed the three hypotheses stated 
above in a greater or a lesser extent and they have contributed to a deeper understanding 
of the phenomenon of Western muhajirat, or female migrants. Consequently, it can be 
suggested that European women have perceived grievances against Europe in the 
moment of departure, which influence their decision to make hijrah. However, the main 
motive for them is the perception of migration as a religious duty imposed by Allah, and 
the belonging to a cause that is bigger than them where their role is to be a righteous 
wife and the mother of the future mujahideen (fighters). The rest of pull factors, are 
seen as incentives to make hijrah except for the adventure factor, which is practically 
absent in their posts. These perceptions and motives are the result of a radicalization 
process that, as the results have shown, is social and happens with greater frequency 
online.   
This research concurs with the results of previous studies about western female 
migration to join ISIS, which have been taken as a reference. But it offers a deeper and 
more comprehensive theoretical understanding of how the radicalization process works 
in this specific phenomenon. These results were based on European women, but they 
can also be extrapolated to all the women around the world since the first phase of the 
radicalization consist on the rejection of the person’s society, therefore it is not only 
applicable to Europe or the West. The use of the social media as a tool for radicalization 
can be applied to other types of extremism and violent extremism; however, the motives 
to join the group or to commit a violent act in the second case will be different.   
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This paper does not aim at proposing recommendations for prevention and de-
radicalization, but it considers that further research should be conducted in order to 
improve the understanding of this phenomenon by conducting in-depth interviews with 
returnees or radicalized women, which is still and under-researched approach due to the 
difficulty to contact these women. In addition, another investigation path that should be 
taken in parallel with the previous one is the analysis of the plans for de-radicalization 
and radicalization prevention in order to improve the countries’ strategies. Two models 
that should be taken into consideration would be the work done by Dounia Bouzar and 
the Centre for Prevention, Deradicalization and Individual Monitoring (Centre de 
Prévention, de Déradicalisation et de Suivi Individuel – CPDSI) in France and the 
Aarhus model of de-radicalization in Denmark, which prioritize the inclusion of the 




At the beginning of this research, it was questioned “Why European women decide to 
leave their home countries and move to Syria and Iraq to join ISIS?”  
Now, it can be asserted that the main reason why European women flee Europe is 
because they have been radicalize up to the point of considering hijrah as a divine 
commandment that must be fulfilled in order to attain paradise in the afterlife. These 
women have firstly got involved in a process of identity change that has been developed 
around a manipulated violent version of Islam and where ISIS recruiters have 
influenced them to accept its violent doctrine. Along this process, which has happened 
both online and offline, but where the social media is a cornerstone, the perceive 
grievances against the West have become unbearable and going to Syria or Iraq 
becomes the only solution for these women, who believe to be part of something bigger 
than them. In addition, the distorted perception of the so-called Caliphate as the only 
place where Muslims can freely live and practice Islam, as well as the wonders that it 
supposedly offers both in material and spiritual terms, have reinforced the assumption 
that they must perform hijrah. 
This research has contributed to the pre-existing studies by offering a more 
comprehensive and theoretical approach. In addition, the results encompass both the 
motives and the radicalization process and propose a clearly defined explanation of the 
phenomenon. In other words, this analysis and its results offer a valuable insight on the 
motives, or perceived motives, that these women have to leave Europe, and on how this 
radicalization through the social media has developed.  
Therefore, in order to prevent radicalization and implement a successful de-
radicalization plan in Europe it is first necessary to understand this phenomenon. 
Consequently, the final objective of this research is to contribute in this first stage of 
problem definition in order to increase the effectiveness of the de-radicalization and 
violent radicalization prevention plans, especially on the strategies focused on European 
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8 Appendix  
8.1 Results from the content analysis 
Name 
Name Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
 Umm Ubaydah 167 28.5 28.5 28.5 
Aqsa Mahmood 162 27.6 27.6 56.1 
Khadijah Dare 9 1.5 1.5 57.7 
Sally Jones 35 6.0 6.0 63.7 
Lena Mamoun Abdel 
Gabir 
4 .7 .7 64.3 
Umm Khattab 31 5.3 5.3 69.6 
Amira Abase 9 1.5 1.5 71.2 
Shamima Begum 1 .2 .2 71.3 
Zawjatu Abou 
Mujahid 
10 1.7 1.7 73.0 
Zahra Halane 21 3.6 3.6 76.6 
Salma Halane 5 .9 .9 77.5 
Umm Muthanna 22 3.8 3.8 81.2 
Umm Irhab 19 3.2 3.2 84.5 
Umm Usama 7 1.2 1.2 85.7 
Muhajirah Amatullah 54 9.2 9.2 94.9 
Umm Mu'awiyah 8 1.4 1.4 96.2 
Umm Awar 8 1.4 1.4 97.6 
UkhtiB 2 .3 .3 98.0 
Umm Abbass 1 .2 .2 98.1 
Umm Dujana 
Britaniya 
5 .9 .9 99.0 
Muhajira umm 
Hamza 
5 .9 .9 99.8 
GreenBirds22 1 .2 .2 100.0 






Social Media Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
 
Twitter 459 78.3 78.3 78.3 
Tumblr 124 21.2 21.2 99.5 
Ask.fm 3 .5 .5 100.0 
Total 586 100.0 100.0  
 
Theme 
Theme Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
 
Identity 13 2.2 2.2 2.2 
Discrimination 8 1.4 1.4 3.6 
Ummah under attack 13 2.2 2.2 5.8 
Sisterhood 36 6.1 6.1 11.9 
Religion 49 8.4 8.4 20.3 
Hijrah 89 15.2 15.2 35.5 
State-building in the 
Caliphate 
30 5.1 5.1 40.6 
Financial security 7 1.2 1.2 41.8 
Marriage 33 5.6 5.6 47.4 
Adventure 2 .3 .3 47.8 
War 62 10.6 10.6 58.4 
Martyrdom 47 8.0 8.0 66.4 
Use of violence 27 4.6 4.6 71.0 
Daily life in 
Syria /Iraq 
60 10.2 10.2 81.2 
The West 44 7.5 7.5 88.7 
Social media 47 8.0 8.0 96.8 
Others 19 3.2 3.2 100.0 











Yes 129 22.0 22.0 22.0 
No 457 78.0 78.0 100.0 
Total 586 100.0 100.0  
 
Own Experience of Migration 
Own Experience Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
 
Yes 37 6.3 28.7 28.7 
No 92 15.7 71.3 100.0 
Total 129 22.0 100.0  
Missing -1 457 78.0   
Total 586 100.0   
 
Migration Relation – Multiple Response 
Migration Relation Responses Percent of Cases 
N Percent 
Migration Relation a Self-Identity 1 1.1% 1.6% 
Discrimination 6 6.9% 9.7% 
Ummah under attack 4 4.6% 6.5% 
Sisterhood belonging 7 8.0% 11.3% 
Religious Duty 33 37.9% 53.2% 
State-Building 20 23.0% 32.3% 
Financial Security 8 9.2% 12.9% 
Marriage 7 8.0% 11.3% 
Adventure 1 1.1% 1.6% 
Total 87 100.0% 140.3% 





Audience Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
 
Specific person 95 16.2 16.2 16.2 
Muslim sisters 41 7.0 7.0 23.2 
Muslims in general 71 12.1 12.1 35.3 
Non-Muslims 18 3.1 3.1 38.4 
Not specified 361 61.6 61.6 100.0 




Recruitment Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
 
Yes 108 18.4 18.4 18.4 
No 478 81.6 81.6 100.0 
Total 586 100.0 100.0  
 
Discourse Tone 
Discourse Tone Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
 
Aggressive 59 10.1 10.1 10.1 
Neutral 372 63.5 63.5 73.5 
Affective 155 26.5 26.5 100.0 
Total 586 100.0 100.0  
Audience Perception 
Audience Perception Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
 
Enemy 32 5.5 5.5 5.5 
Ally 137 23.4 23.4 28.8 
Not specified 417 71.2 71.2 100.0 
Total 586 100.0 100.0  
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Relation to Violence 
Relation to Violence Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
 
Support 112 19.1 19.1 19.1 
Against 4 .7 .7 19.8 
Not specified 470 80.2 80.2 100.0 
Total 586 100.0 100.0  
 
ISIS Relation 
ISIS Relation Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
 
Yes 207 35.3 35.3 35.3 
No 379 64.7 64.7 100.0 
Total 586 100.0 100.0  
Discourse – Multiple Responses 
Discourse Responses Percent of 
Cases N Percent 
Discourse a Kuffar /Kaffir 39 8.5% 13.7% 
Mujahid 33 7.2% 11.6% 
Muhajirah 14 3.1% 4.9% 
Ukthi/Akhawat/Sister 68 14.8% 23.9% 
Khilafah/Dawla/Dar 
al-Islam 98 21.4% 34.4% 
Dar al-kufr 14 3.1% 4.9% 
Shaheed/Martyr 49 10.7% 17.2% 
Kill 22 4.8% 7.7% 
Dunya 9 2.0% 3.2% 
Jannah 21 4.6% 7.4% 
Hijrah 40 8.7% 14.0% 
Jihad 24 5.2% 8.4% 
Sharia 20 4.4% 7.0% 
Ummah 7 1.5% 2.5% 
Total 458 100.0% 160.7% 





ISIS Portrayal Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
 Positive 193 32.9 93.2 93.2 
Neutral 11 1.9 5.3 98.6 
Negative 3 .5 1.4 100.0 
Total 207 35.3 100.0  
Missing -1 379 64.7   
Total 586 100.0   
 





Migration Related Yes Count 89 40 129 
% within Migration 
Related 
69.0% 31.0% 100.0% 
% within Recruitment 82.4% 8.4% 22.0% 
No Count 19 438 457 
% within Migration 
Related 
4.2% 95.8% 100.0% 
% within Recruitment 17.6% 91.6% 78.0% 
Total Count 108 478 586 
% within Migration 
Related 
18.4% 81.6% 100.0% 
% within Recruitment 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 









Aggressive Neutral Affective 
Audience 
Perception 
Enemy Count 18 13 1 32 
% within Audience 
Perception 
56.3% 40.6% 3.1% 100.0% 
% within Discourse 
Tone 
30.5% 3.5% 0.6% 5.5% 
Ally Count 4 78 55 137 
% within Audience 
Perception 
2.9% 56.9% 40.1% 100.0% 
% within Discourse 
Tone 
6.8% 21.0% 35.5% 23.4% 
Not 
Specified 
Count 37 281 99 417 
% within Audience 
Perception 
8.9% 67.4% 23.7% 100.0% 
% within Discourse 
Tone 
62.7% 75.5% 63.9% 71.2% 
Total Count 59 372 155 586 
% within Audience 
Perception 
10.1% 63.5% 26.5% 100.0% 
% within Discourse 
Tone 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 








Contingency Table of Relation to Violence and Discourse Tone 
 
Discourse Tone 
Total Aggressive Neutral Affective 
Relation to 
Violence 
Support Count 45 53 14 112 
% within Relation 
to Violence 
40.2% 47.3% 12.5% 100.0% 
% within Discourse 
Tone 
76.3% 14.2% 9.0% 19.1% 
Against Count 0 1 3 4 
% within Relation 
to Violence 
0.0% 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
% within Discourse 
Tone 
0.0% 0.3% 1.9% 0.7% 
Not specified Count 14 318 138 470 
% within Relation 
to Violence 
3.0% 67.7% 29.4% 100.0% 
% within Discourse 
Tone 
23.7% 85.5% 89.0% 80.2% 
Total Count 59 372 155 586 
% within Relation 
to Violence 
10.1% 63.5% 26.5% 100.0% 
% within Discourse 
Tone 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
χ2 (4, N = 586) = 144.864, p < .001 ϕ Cramer = .352 
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8.2 Appendix B: Glossary 
Akhawat: sisters. 
Alhamdulillah: Arabic expression that means “praise be to God”. 
Allahu Akbar: Arabic expression that usually means “Allah is the greatest”. 
Dabiq: ISIS propaganda magazine. 
Dar al-kufr:  Land of disbelief. A term used by ISIS to refer to all the countries that are 
not ruled by Sharia law.  
Dar al-Islam: Land of Islam governed by Sharia law. Term used by ISIS to refer to the 
territory under its control. 
Dawla: In Arabic is the word for state. ISIS supporters use it to refer to ISIS and its 
territory. 
Dunya: This world of life, as opposed to the Hereafter. 
Fardh: Religious duty commanded by Allah. 
Fardh ayn: Individual duty. It refers to tasks that every Muslim has to perform. 
Haqq: Arabic word for truth. Also known as Al-Haqq.  
Haram: Refers to an act that is forbidden by Allah. 
Hijrah: Migration, emigration. Also known as hijra. It refers to the Prophet’s migration 
form Mecca to Medina and it refers to the act of leaving a place to seek sanctuary or 
freedom from persecution. Nowadays, ISIS members use the term to refer to their 
migration from a non-Islamic country to the purported Islamic State.  
InshaAllah: Arabic expression that means, “If God wills”. Also written Inshallah. 
Jannah: Paradise, heaven. 
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Jihad: Arab word that means ‘struggle’ or ‘strive’. It is divided between the inner 
spiritual struggle, also known as ‘greater jihad’ and the outer physical struggle to 
protect Islam, or ‘lesser jihad’. The lesser jihad can take a violent or a non-violent form. 
Therefore, using Jihad as a synonym of ‘holy war’ is incorrect. However, both the West 
and ISIS employ the term as a synonym of war.  
Jilbab: long and loose-fit robe that covers the entire body except for the face, the hands 
and the head.   
Kafir: (plural kuffar) a person who refuses to submit himself to Allah (God), a 
disbeliever in God. ISIS uses the term to refer to all those who are considered 
disbelievers. Also known as kaffir or kufr.  
Khilafah: Arab word for caliphate. ISIS uses it to refer to the territory under its control. 
In the summer of 2014 ISIS proclaimed the creation of a Caliphate in the Syria and Iraq.  
Kik: Encrypted message application.  
Kunya: A type of surname or proper name common in Arabic, which means ‘father of’ 
or ‘mother of’. 
Makar: Women’s hostel for unmarried women in ISIS. Also known as maqqar.  
Mujahid: (plural mujahideen) A Muslim fighter waging military jihad against the 
enemies of Islam. 
Muhajirah: (plural muhajirat) Female migrant.  
Niqab: Cloth that covers the head and the face, but not the eyes.  
Qitaal: fighting. This word is used in the Quran to refer to the actual fight, whereas 
jihad refers to struggle in general. These terms have been confused in some 
interpretations of the Quran.  
Quran: Holy book of Islam, it is believed to be the revelations from God. 
Salafism: Ultraconservative movement within Sunni Islam that emerged in the 19th-
century and supports the old traditions such as the implementation of the Sharia law.  
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Shaheed:  A martyr, someone who dies in the name of Allah. Also known as Shahid. 
Sham: Arabic name for the territory of Syria in the Middle Ages. 
Sharia: The Islamic moral code and religious law. ISIS embraces a very strict 
interpretation of Sharia and it has been established in the territories under their control.  
Sunnah: Book of the deeds, teachings and sayings of the prophet Muhammad. 
Takfir: The pronouncement of a Muslim as an apostate or non-believer. It is a legal 
categorization for which the sentence has traditionally been the death. Therefore, it is 
usually understood by jihadist as a religious authorization to kill the subject. 
Ukhti: Sister. 
Ummah: The worldwide Muslim community. 
Wallahi: by God. 
Ya3ni: Arabic word that means like. 
